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Abstract
Belief revision and belief update are two different forms of belief change, and they serve different
purposes. In this paper we focus on belief update, the formalization of change in beliefs due to
changes in the world. The complexity of the basic update (introduced by Winslett, 1990) has been
determined by Eiter and Gottlob (1992). Since then, many other formalizations have been proposed to
overcome the limitations and drawbacks of Winslett’s update. In this paper we analyze the complexity
of the proposals presented in the literature: the standard semantics by Winslett (1986), the minimal
change with exception and the minimal change with maximal disjunctive information by Zhang and
Foo (1996), the update with disjunctive function by Herzig (1996), the abduction-based update and
the generalized update by Boutilier (1996). We relate some of these approaches to belief update to
previous work on closed world reasoning. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The study of belief change has received considerable attention from the AI, database
and philosophy communities. Belief change deals with the incorporation of new facts into
an agent’s beliefs. There are two basic forms of belief change: belief revision and belief
update, depending on the cause of the difference between the current agent’s belief and the
update.
The old beliefs of the agent may be mistaken or incomplete: in this case the usual
approach is that of belief revision, captured by the AGM postulates [1]. On the other hand,
an agent’s beliefs, while correct at one time, may become obsolete due to changes in the
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scenario of interest. The basic treatment of updates has been given by Winslett [29], while
a general framework has been proposed by Katsuno and Mendelzon [16]. The following
example shows a very simple scenario in which updates are needed.
Example 1. We consider the database of the RCH, a company that deals with com-
puters. Suppose that it is initially known available(keyboards)∧¬available
(screens), meaning that there are some keyboards in the warehouse, but no screen. Up-
dating with available(screens), the expected result is available(keyboards)
∧ available(screens).
The above example, in spite of its simplicity, shows one of the basic principles of update:
indeed, the information about keyboards available(keyboards) should continue to
hold, since it is not affected by the fact available(screens). This principle is often
referred to as the principle of minimal change. In the above example, the minimal change
assumption alone gives enough information to completely characterize the knowledge
base (k.b.) after the update. However, more complex scenarios may give rise to several
alternatives.
The first update framework for knowledge representation introduced in the literature is
that proposed by Winslett [29]. Many drawbacks and limitations of the initial proposal
of Winslett have been discovered. The first one regards how disjunctive information is
treated: as in many approaches of non-monotonic reasoning, the result of the update may
be incorrect if the new piece of information to be incorporated is in disjunctive form (such
as x1 ∨ x2). The next example shows a scenario in which this problem arises.
Example 2. The RCH company stores computer parts in a warehouse composed of three
rooms. The first room contains all cards, the second contains cases, and the third one
screens. By accident, a fire is set up in the room that contains cards, and all items
stored there are moved to the other two rooms. The old database is (for our purposes)
contains(Cards,R1) ∧ ¬contains(Cards,R2) ∧ ¬contains(Cards,R3), which
means that only the first room contains cards. After the fire destroyed that room, all we
know is that all cards have been moved in rooms R2 and R3. Some items may have
been moved to one room and some to the other one. The new piece of information
to be incorporated is thus µ = ¬contains(Cards,R1) ∧ (contains(Cards,R2) ∨
contains(Cards,R3)), which denotes the fact that at least one room between R2 and
R3 (possibly both) contain cards. The intended result of the update should be µ itself,
but Winslett’s update gives instead contains(Cards,R1)∧ (contains(Cards,R2) 6≡
contains(Cards,R3)). This is not the intuitive result, since it rules out the possibility
that some cards have gone to R2 and some to R3.
Another drawback of the original formulation of update is that knowledge about previous
states is never changed. Sometimes updates lead agents to revise their knowledge about
the previous state. In such cases, update is related with revision as intended in the AGM
framework [1,7]. The next example, similar to one shown by Boutilier [4], shows this
drawback.
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Example 3. The RCH company bought a stock of keyboards that, once delivered, turn
out to be of a brand different from the expected one. In order to find out whether the
keyboards are compatible with the computers they assemble, the executives of the company
put in charge a worker do this check. Since they do not know whether the keyboards
are compatible, the initial k.b. is keyboard_compatible 6≡ keyboard_non_comp,
where the variable keyboard_compatible represents the fact that a stock of
compatible keyboards is in the warehouse, and keyboard_non_comp represents the
fact that a stock of non-compatible keyboards is in the warehouse.
The employee in charge of testing the keyboards finds out that they are in fact
non-compatible. Thus, the k.b. is updated with keyboard_non_comp. The result of
the update is ¬keyboard_compatible ∧ keyboard_non_comp, and this is the
expected result. However, if we query about the state of the warehouse at the beginning
(that is, we query the knowledge base about what was true before the test), we obtain
keyboard_compatible 6≡ keyboard_non_comp. This is clearly not a complete
answer, since we know that the keyboards in the warehouse were already non-compatible,
even if we did not know it. The inability of updating the knowledge about previous states
is a drawback of many update formalisms.
Another drawback that Winslett’s update shares with many other updates is its treatment
of iteration. This is due to the fact that these semantics accommodate the updating formula
into the knowledge base as soon as possible. There are scenarios, however, in which such
a behavior is inappropriate [12].
In this paper we analyze the complexity of some of the proposals introduced so far. The
complexity of the PMA approach (Possible Models Approach, also known as Winslett’s
update) has been shown by Eiter and Gottlob [8] to be at the second level of the polynomial
hierarchy, namely 5p2. The analyzed problem is the entailment, that is:
Given a knowledge base φ, an update µ and a propositional formula ψ , decide
whether ψ is implied by φ ∗W µ, the updated knowledge base.
In this paper we also analyze the problem of iterated update: given a sequence of
updates, decide whether a query is implied by the updated knowledge base.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section we briefly summarize the basic
concepts of the propositional calculus and computational complexity, and three semantics
of closed world assumption that will be related to update. The following sections are
devoted to updates. In each section we give the formal definition of an update framework,
then we show one or more examples, and we prove its complexity. In some cases updates
are related to the closed world assumption, and this will be proved. For a more general
introduction to belief update we refer the reader to the recent survey by Herzig [14].
2. Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we assume a finite propositional language L over an alphabet
of atoms X. Any piece of information (such as previous agents’ beliefs, updates, etc.) is
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represented by a propositional formula, where not otherwise specified. A literal is an atom
or its negation. A positive literal is an atom. A clause is a disjunction of literals. A clause
is said to be positive if it is a disjunction of positive literals. We denote a clause with the
set of literals it contains. As a result, if γ and δ are clauses, then δ ⊆ γ means that the
literals of δ are a subset of the literals of γ . An interpretation is a set of atoms: if I is an
interpretation, then x ∈ I means that x is true, while x /∈ I means that x is false. We extend
this truth evaluation to propositional formulae in the usual way. An interpretation I is a
model of a formula φ if and only if the formula is true in that interpretation. The set of
all possible interpretations over the given alphabet is denoted byM. A formula is said to
be complete if it has exactly one model. Given a formula φ, we denote by Var(φ) the set
of atoms it contains. In some places we implicitly assume that the alphabet is composed
exactly of the variables appearing in the considered formulae.
We denote by Mod(φ) the set of all the models of the formula φ. We use also Form to
denote the inverse function of Mod, that is, Form(A) is a propositional formula whose set
of models is A. This function is not unique, since equivalent formulae have the same set of
models; however, this is unimportant for our purposes.
Given two interpretations I and J , we denote by Diff (I, J ) their symmetric difference,
that is, Diff (I, J ) = I\J ∪ J\I . Intuitively, Diff (I, J ) is the set of atoms to which the
interpretations I and J assign a different truth value. Given a set A and an ordering 6 on
the elements of A, we denote by min(A,6) the set of the minimal elements of A with
respect to the ordering 6. When min(A,6) is a composed of a single element, we often
assume (where not confusing) that it denotes the element rather than its singleton.
We sometimes use substitutions. A substitution is a set of pairs atom/formula. Given a
substitution S = {xi/ψi}, and a propositional formula µ, we denote by µ[S] the formula
obtained from µ by replacing each occurrence of xi with the correspondingψi .
2.1. Closed world reasoning
In the sequel we use three formalizations of the closed world assumption, namely
propositional circumscription, generalized world closed assumption and the CURB
formalism.
The closed world assumption has been introduced as an attempt to formalize a common
sense rule: facts that are not known to be true can be assumed to be false [24]. For example,
if we do not know whether the Colosseum has been repainted in pink, we can assume it is
still not pink. Formalizing such rule is not always so easy. Let for example our knowledge
base be a ∨ b. Since a is not believed to hold (that is, a ∨ b 6|= a), we assume that it
is false. Since b is not implied by a ∨ b, we can conclude that b is false. The result is
{a ∨ b,¬a,¬b}, which is inconsistent. Obtaining an inconsistent knowledge base from
a consistent one is a situation to avoid. Subsequent formalizations of the closed world
reasoning do not suffer from this drawback.
Circumscription can be viewed as a form of closed world assumption. It has been defined
for first order logic [21], but the propositional restriction suffices for the purposes of
this paper. The rationale of circumscription is that the assumption “not known = false”
can be formalized by selecting only the minimal models of the knowledge base under
consideration. Since minimal models are those obtained by setting to false as many
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variables as possible in the knowledge base, this is a way to formalize the closed world
assumption. Since a consistent knowledge base has at least a minimal model, it follows
that circumscription does not introduce inconsistency. Formally, the circumscription of a
formula µ is defined as:
CIRC(µ)= Form(min(Mod(µ),⊆)).
This is a simplified definition of circumscription, in which all variables are minimized.
It however suffices for the purposes of this paper.
Circumscribing the formula a ∨ b we obtain two minimal models, namely {a} and {b},
corresponding to the resulting formula a 6≡ b. This result, while consistent, is not intuitively
correct. In many cases, we cannot conclude that a and b cannot both be true at the same
time from a knowledge base stating that either a or b are true. This problem has led to a
number of semantics.
The generalized closed world assumption [22] of a formula µ is defined in terms of the
set of free for negation atoms of µ, denoted by FFN(µ). These are the variables we are
allowed to set to false while applying the closed world assumption to the formula µ.
There are two ways to define FFN(µ). The first is syntactic: xi is free for negation if
and only if for every positive clause γ such that µ 6|= γ it holds µ 6|= γ ∨ xi . The second
definition of FFN(µ) is semantic: the free for negation atoms of µ are the atoms that are
false in all minimal (with respect to set inclusion) models of µ. The generalized closed
world assumption of µ is the formula GCWA(µ)= µ∧ {¬xi | xi ∈ FFN(µ)}.
The CURB formalisms has been introduced by Eiter et al. [10] as a variant of
circumscription. In this paper we use the simplified version CURB1 [10]. The intuitively
incorrect result CIRC(a ∨ b)= a 6≡ b is obtained because the model {a, b} of a ∨ b is not
one of its minimal models. However, it has two properties: it contains two minimal models
{a} and {b}; and it is the minimal model of a ∨ b with this property. The idea is to include
all models with these two properties in the result.
Such process is formalized using the upper bound of sets of models. Given a set of
models S, we define the set of the upper bounds of S in µ as
Ub(S,µ)= {J ∈Mod(µ) | ∀J ′ ∈ S . J ′ ⊆ J }.
These are the models of µ that contain all the interpretations in S. The models of
CURB1(µ) are minimal elements of a Ub(S,µ), where S is a subset of the set of the








We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of computational
complexity. We use the standard notation of complexity classes and oracles [15]. We also
use higher complexity classes defined using oracles. In particular, PA (NPA) is the class of
decision problems that are solved in polynomial time by deterministic (nondeterministic)
Turing machines using an oracle for A. All problems we analyze reside in the polynomial
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Note that 1p1 = P, 6p1 = NP and 5p1 = co-NP. The polynomial hierarchy PH is defined
as PH = ⋃i>0 6pi . Moreover, 6p2 = NPNP, that is the class of problems solvable in
nondeterministic polynomial time on a Turing machine that uses for free an oracle for
NP. The class 5p2 is defined as co-6
p
2 . The class 1
p
2 is the class of problems solvable in
polynomial time using an NP oracle. The definition of hardness and completeness for all
these classes are similar to those of NP-hardness and completeness.
The prototypical 5p2-complete problem is based on the quantified boolean formulae.
Namely, a formula ∀X∃Y.F , where X and Y are sets of variables and F is a formula on
the alphabet X ∪ Y , is valid if and only if for all interpretations X1 ⊆ X there exists an
interpretation Y1 ⊆ Y such that X1 ∪ Y1 satisfies the formula F .
Definition 1 (∀∃QBF ). Given a propositional formula F over the alphabet X ∪ Y , decide
whether ∀X∃Y.F is valid.
A complete problem for the class 1p2 is obtained by considering the minimal models of
a formula, using the lexicographic ordering on interpretations.
Definition 2 (minlexmod). Given a propositional formula F overX = {x1, . . . , xn}, decide
whether the lexicographically minimal model of F contains xn.
2.3. Updates
Let φ represents the initial k.b. and µ an update. We denote by φ ∗ µ the updated
knowledge base. Three problems are considered in this paper. The first is to decide what
is implied by the the k.b. after the update, that is, given a propositional formula ψ , decide
whether
φ ∗µ ψ.
This problem is called query answering.
In the first semantics proposed to formalize updates, the formula φ ∗µ is defined in such
a way it is consistent whenever both φ and µ are consistent. In some new approaches to
update, this is not always true. A problem we analyze is to check, given φ and µ, whether
φ ∗µ is consistent.
In practical applications, the k.b. must be updated many times, to reflect multiple
changes in the world. This means we have to consider the problem of iterated update, i.e.,
the problem of modifying a knowledge base with a sequence of updates. Many proposals
P. Liberatore / Artificial Intelligence 119 (2000) 141–190 147
in the literature focus on single-step updates, and implicitly assume that the result of a
sequence of updates [µ1, . . . ,µm] is simply
(· · · (φ ∗µ1) ∗ · · ·) ∗µm.
Thus, the problem of query answering for iterated update is to decide whether
(· · · (φ ∗µ1) ∗ · · ·) ∗µm ψ
given φ, [µ1, . . . ,µm], and ψ as input.
2.4. A note on possible worlds
A concept often used in belief revision (as well as many other fields of logics) is that of
possible world. Since this concept is used in this paper, a short explanation is needed.
Assume we are given a propositional formula φ, for instance φ = x1 ∨ x2. Intuitively,
this formula means that we know that either x1 is true or x2 is true, or both. This piece of
knowledge is not complete: indeed, we do not know for certain the truth value of x1 and
x2. More precisely, three possible scenarios are consistent with the knowledge base:
(1) x1 is true and x2 is false;
(2) x1 is false and x2 is true;
(3) both x1 and x2 are true.
Each possible scenario is called a possible world. If knowledge is represented in the
propositional calculus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between possible worlds and
models.
In the example above, if we know φ = x1 ∨ x2, then the possible worlds in which either
x1 or x2 are true are consistent with this knowledge. Conversely, knowing x1∨ x2 rules out
the possible world in which both x1 and x2 are false, as this possible world is not consistent
with our current knowledge.
3. Standard semantics
Consider a propositional formula φ representing the state of the world. This information
is assumed to be correct, but not (necessarily) complete. When a change in the world
occurs, this description of the world must be modified.
The k.b. φ can be considered as a description of the set of possible worlds that are
currently considered plausible. For example, if φ = x1 ∨ x2, then the situation in which x1
is false and x2 is true is a description of the world that is consistent with φ. Namely, three
scenarios are consistent with φ = x1 ∨ x2, each corresponding to a model of φ:
world in which x1 is true and x2 is false →model {x1},
world in which x1 is false and x2 is true →model {x2},
world in which x1 is true and x2 is true →model {x1, x2}.
Let the update be the propositional formula µ=¬x2. The assumption, in belief update,
is that some changes took place, and what is known about those changes is that µ is valid
afterwards.
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Assume that the model {x1, x2} (representing one the possible worlds before changes)
was the actual world before the update. A very easy way to update this possible world is
by modifying it to make x2 false, thus obtaining the possible world {x1}.
The same operation must be done to all other possible worlds: in the model {x1} the
atom x2 is already false, thus it is not changed. The model {x2} is changed to ∅. As a result,
the possible worlds after the change are:
{x1} ∅
which can be represented by the formula ¬x2. We conclude that φ ∗µ=¬x2.
When the update is atomic, or is a conjunction of atoms, updating is simple. The problem
is more complex when µ is a disjunction or a more complex formula. In such cases, the
update cannot be done just by changing the value of the atoms in the models of φ. Let for
example φ and µ be defined as follows.
φ = x1 ∧¬x3, µ= x1 ∨ x2.
The models of φ are {x1} and {x1, x2}. Updating with µ means that three scenarios are
possible afterwards: one in which x1 is true and x2 is false, one in which x1 is false and
x2 is true, and one in which both x1 and x2 are true. As a result, the models of φ must be
modified to take into account the fact that something happened yielding to one of the three
scenarios above.
Consider the model {x1} of φ, representing a possible world before the change. There
are three possible changes that yield to a scenario in which µ is true, namely:
(1) nothing happened;
(2) x2 becomes true and x1 becomes false;
(3) x2 becomes true.
Thus, the possible worlds obtained by updating {x1} with µ are:
{x1} nothing happens ⇒{x1}
{x1} x2 becomes true and x1 becomes false ⇒{x2}
{x1} x2 becomes true ⇒{x1, x2}.
One can easily verify that these are also the outcomes of updating {x1, x2}. As a result,
the result of the update is
φ ∗µ= (x1 ∨ x2)∧¬x3.
This way of defining the update can be formalized as follows [27]. Formula φ may
have several models, and the same for µ. However, µ may not contain all atoms of the
alphabet. As a result, when we consider the update of a possible world of φ with µ, we
must consider that µ gives information only on a subset of the atoms, namely Var(µ). In
the example above µ gives no information about x3, so the value given by the models of φ
should not be changed.
Let us consider the update in the case where φ is a complete formula. Since complete
formulae are those having exactly one model, and update is defined in terms of models, we
can write φ = Form(I). We have:
Form(I) ∗SSU µ= Form
({J | J\Var(µ)= I\Var(µ) and J  µ}).
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In other words, the value of I over the variables that are not mentioned in µ is
maintained. The value of the other variables is modified in such a way I becomes a model
of µ.
When φ is not a complete formula, update is defined considering that each model of φ





This definition can be reformulated as:
φ ∗SSU µ= Form
({J ∈Mod(µ) | ∃I ∈Mod(φ) . I\Var(µ)= J\Var(µ)}).
Other update operators are defined in terms of the symmetric difference between two
models, defined as Diff (I, J ) = (I\J ) ∪ (J\I). This is the set of variables that have
different truth value in I and J . The standard semantics can be defined in terms of this
measure of distance:
φ ∗SSU µ= Form
({J ∈Mod(µ) | ∃I ∈Mod(φ) . Diff (I, J )⊆ Var(µ)}).
Example 4. We determine the result of the update in the first two examples of the
introduction. Example 1 can be formally encoded in the propositional calculus as follows.
We denote by φ1 the knowledge base before the update and by µ1 the updating formula.
φ1 = x1 ∧¬x2, µ1 = x2.
We use x1 to represent the fact that keyboards are available, and x2 to represent that
screens are available. We use variables from an alphabet X = {x1, x2, . . .} (instead of
available(keyboards), etc.) for the sake of simplicity.
Let us determine φ1 ∗SSU µ1. Formula φ1 has only one model, namely {x1}, while µ1
has two models: {x2} and {x1, x2}. The result of the update φ1 ∗SSU µ1 can be determined
by computing the difference between models of φ1 and models of µ1, and comparing the
result with Var(µ1)= {x2}.
Diff ({x1}, {x2})= {x1, x2} 6⊆ Var(µ1),
Diff ({x1}, {x1, x2})= {x2} ⊆ Var(µ1).
The models of the updated knowledge base are the models of µ1 such that one of the
differences to models of φ1 is a subset of the variables of µ1. As a result, the model {x2}
is not a model of the updated knowledge base, while the model {x1, x2} is. We conclude
φ1 ∗SSU µ1 = x1 ∧ x2.
Let us consider the scenario described in Example 2, which can be formalized as follows:
φ2 = x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3,
µ2 =¬x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3).
We use x1, x2, and x3 to represent whether the first, second, and third room contain cards,
respectively. Since φ2 holds before the fire, whileµ2 holds afterwards, our knowledge after
the update is represented by φ2 ∗µ2. Let us consider what is the result of this update using
the standard semantics.
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First of all, φ2 has only one model, while µ2 has three models:
Mod(φ2)= {{x1}},
Mod(µ2)= {{x2}, {x3}, {x2, x3}}.
By definition, the models of φ2 ∗SSU µ2 are the models of µ2 such that there exists
a model of φ2 that differs from it only for a subset of the variables in Var(µ2). Now,
Var(µ2)= {x1, x2, x3}, while {x1} is the only model of φ2. As a result, we have:
Mod(φ2 ∗SSU µ2)
= {J ∈Mod(µ2) | {x1}\{x1, x2, x3} = J\{x1, x2, x3}} =Mod(µ2).
As a result, the result of the update coincides with µ2. This is the expected result, since
any of the three models of µ2 is intuitively a possible outcome of the update.
The standard semantics can be easily proved to be co-NP-complete. Hardness is an easy
consequence of the fact that true ∗SSU true  ψ if and only if ψ is valid. Membership in
co-NP follows from the fact that checking whether φ ∗SSU µ 6ψ can be done by guessing
two models I ∈Mod(φ) and J ∈Mod(µ) such that I\Var(µ)= J\Var(µ) and J 2ψ .
An interesting way to express the standard semantics is given by the following theorem.





where SI = {xi/¬xi | xi ∈ I }, and NVAR is the operator from propositional formulae to
propositional formulae defined by NVAR(µ)= µ∧ {¬xi | xi /∈ Var(µ)}.
Proof. By definition, J  φ ∗SSU µ if and only if J ∈ Mod(µ) and there exists a model
I ∈Mod(φ) such that I\Var(µ)= J\Var(µ).
Expression J 
∨
I∈Mod(φ) NVAR(µ[SI ])[SI ] is equivalent to “there exists a model I of
φ such that J  NVAR(µ[SI ])[SI ]”. The substitution SI maps each model J into the model
Diff (I, J ). Thus, the above formula is in turn equivalent to
∃I ∈Mod(φ) . Diff (I, J )  NVAR(µ[SI ]).
Now, since Var(µ)= Var(µ[SI ]), the above formula is true if and only if J is a model
of µ, and Diff (I, J )\Var(µ) is empty. As a result, J is a model of the right-hand side
of the statement of the theorem if and only if there exists a model I of φ such that
I\Var(µ)= J\Var(µ), and this is equivalent to the definition of φ ∗SSU µ. 2
The usefulness of this theorem is that, as will be proved in the sequel, many update
operators (Winslett’s, MCE, MCD) can be defined in a similar manner. This allows for a
uniform way of expressing these update operators, and thus to prove theorems holding for
all of them.
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4. Winslett’s update
Consider a propositional formula φ representing the state of the world. This information
is assumed to be correct, but not (necessarily) complete. When the world changes, this
description of the world must be modified. An assumption of belief update is that we know
a propositional formula µ which is true in the new situation. Winslett’s approach is model-
based, that is, the result of the update φ ∗W µ is defined in terms of the sets of models of
φ and µ. This guarantees the update to obey the principle of irrelevance of syntax [7]: the
result of the update does not depend on the syntactic form in which the knowledge base
and the update are expressed.
The underlying assumption in belief revision and update is that of minimal change: the
knowledge base φ should be changed as little as possible, in the process of incorporation
of the update µ.
Winslett’s update operates on a model by model base. Let I be an interpretation, and let
6I be the ordering on interpretations defined as:
J 6I Z iff Diff (I, J )⊆Diff (I,Z).
Intuitively, J 6I Z means that, since J and I have more literals assigned to the same truth
value than Z and I , the interpretation J must be considered to be closer to I than Z.
The update of the k.b. φ when a new formula µ becomes true after a change is defined
considering each model of φ separately.






This update was initially proposed in the context of databases [28], in which one can
safely assume that all the updates are atomic, that is, the formula µ is always a literal. In
artificial intelligence this is often considered to be too restrictive. When µ is allowed to
be any formula, and mainly when it is a disjunction of literals, the result of the Winslett’s
update may be intuitively incorrect. Example 2 shows a situation of this kind.
Example 5. Let us compare Winslett’s update with the standard semantics. We consider
the knowledge base φ1 and the update µ1 as defined in the previous example:
φ1 = x1 ∧¬x2, µ1 = x2.
Formula x1 ∧¬x2 has only one model, namely {x1}, while formula µ1 has two models:
{x2} and {x1, x2}. By definition, it holds:






The latter formula can be computed by checking the difference between models of µ1
and the model {x1}.
Diff ({x1}, {x2})= {x1, x2}, Diff ({x1}, {x1, x2})= {x2}.
Since the second difference is contained in the first one, we have that {x1, x2} is the only
model in min(Mod(µ1),6{x1}), from which we conclude that φ1 ∗W µ1 = x1 ∧ x2.
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Let us consider the update of Example 2. We compute the update, and see that the result
is different from the expected one. First of all, the knowledge base and the update are:
φ2 = x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3, µ2 =¬x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3).
The knowledge base φ2 has exactly one model, namely {x1}. As a result, Winslett’s
update is can be computed as follows:






We have to select the models I of µ2 such that no other model ofµ2 is closer to {x1}. The
formula µ1 has three models, namely {x2}, {x3}, and {x2, x3}. Computing the differences
between these models and {x1}, we obtain:
Diff ({x1}, {x2})= {x1, x2},
Diff ({x1}, {x3})= {x1, x3},
Diff ({x1}, {x2, x3})= {x1, x2, x3}.
The third model is not in min(Mod(µ2),6{x1}), while both {x2} and {x3} are. As a result,
the result of the update is:
φ2 ∗W µ2 = Form({{x2}, {x3}})=¬x1 ∧ (x2 6≡ x3).
Liberatore and Schaerf [19] proved that Winslett’s update can be expressed in terms of
circumscription, and vice versa.







It has already pointed out that Winslett’s update can be reduced to circumscription [19,
29]. In this paper we consider a new reduction.





where SI is the substitution {xi/¬xi | xi ∈ I }.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1. 2
This reduction is not polynomial, since the size of the right-hand side formula is
linear in the number of models of φ (which can be exponential in the size of φ).
From a computational point of view, the reductions by Winsett [29] and Liberatore and
Schaerf [19], being polynomial, are better. However, as shown in the sequel, many update
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operators can be formalized in a manner similar to that of Theorem 3, and this allows for
the formulation and proof of general theorems.
The complexity of query answering for Winslett’s update is 5p2-complete, as proved by
Eiter and Gottlob [8]. The complexity of iterated query answering is shown in Section 8.
Formalizing Example 2 using Winslett’s update gives an incorrect result. This problem
is related to the problem of disjunction in the closed world assumption. While there are
quite a number of proposals for solving the problem in the context of CWA, only recently
the problem has been addressed for belief update.
5. Minimal change with exceptions
This approach, introduced by Zhang and Foo [30], attempts to overcome the non-
intuitive treatment of disjunctive information of the original formulation of update. Let
us motivate the Minimal Change with Exception update with an example. The knowledge
base and the update in Example 2 are φ2 = x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ ¬x3 and µ2 = ¬x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3),
respectively. The updateµ2 has three models, namely {x2}, {x3}, and {x2, x3}. As explained
in Example 2, all of them should be models of the updated knowledge base. However,
Winslett’s update selects only the first two, discarding {x2, x3}. In order to include that
model, we consider an exception to the rule of minimality, in such a way that {x2, x3},
although not minimal, is selected. This can be obtained by considering x2 and x3 as
variables not to be computed in the difference between interpretations.
The formal definition of ∗MCE is similar to that of Winslett’s update, except for a
set of atoms EXC(I,µ) which are “erased” from the symmetric difference between
interpretations.
Given a knowledge base φ and an update µ, Zhang and Foo define D(µ) as the set of




∣∣∣∣ µ  γ, and there is no other clause γ ′such that γ ′ ⊂ γ and µ  γ ′
}
.






Then, define 6RI , where R is a set of variables, as the ordering among interpretations
such that:
J 6RI Z iff Diff (I, J )\R ⊆Diff (I,Z)\R.
This way, the variables in R do not affect the closeness measure (6I ) between
interpretations. The result of the update is defined as follows.
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In other words, the variables in EXC(I,µ) are ignored while computing the difference
between I and the models of µ.
Example 6. Let us consider the knowledge base φ2 and the update µ2 as in Example 2.
We compute φ2 ∗MCE µ2. First of all,






since {x1} is the only model of φ2. Let us determine the elements of D(µ2) that do not
have {x1} as a model.
• D(µ2)= {¬x1, x2 ∨ x3}.
• None of these clauses is satisfied by {x1}, thus EXC({x1},µ2)= {x1, x2, x3}.
• This means that all variables have to be removed from the difference between models,
thus J 6EXC({x1},µ2){x1} Z holds for any pair of models J and Z.
As a result, the updated knowledge base is
φ2 ∗MCE µ2 = Form({{x2}, {x3}, {x2, x3}})=¬x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3).
Let us consider a more complex example. Let φ3 and µ3 be as follows:
φ3 =¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3 ∧¬x4,
µ3 = ((x1 6≡ x2)∧¬x3 ∧¬x4)∨ (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3).
The only model of φ3 is ∅, thusD(µ3) is the set of the minimal positive clauses implied
by µ3. The (only) minimal positive clause implied by µ3 is x1 ∨ x2, thus EXC(∅,µ) =
{x1, x2}. As a result,
φ3 ∗MCE µ3 = (x1 6≡ x2)∧¬x3 ∧¬x4.
The rationale of Minimal Change with Exception is similar to that of the Generalized
Closed World Assumption. Indeed, GCWA can be reduced to MCE, and vice versa. We give
three preliminary lemmas. The first relates the free for negation atoms with the exceptions.
Lemma 1. For any propositional formula µ and any interpretation I on the alphabetX:
FFN(µ[SI ])=X\EXC(I,µ)
where SI = {xi/¬xi | xi ∈ I }, and FFN(ψ) denotes the atoms that are free for negation
for ψ (see Section 2.1).
Proof. Let us formally express the fact that xi is a free for negation atom of µ[SI ], and
that xi is not an exception, as boolean quantified formulae. Since a clause is positive if and
only if ∅ is not among its model, the free for negation atoms of µ[SI ] can be characterized
as (we assume, as usual, that ∧ has precedence over⇒):
xi ∈ FFN(µ[SI ]) iff ∀γ . (∅ 2 γ )∧ (µ[SI ] 2 γ )⇒ (µ[SI ] 2 γ ∨ xi)
where γ is intended to be quantified over all the clauses over the alphabet X.
P. Liberatore / Artificial Intelligence 119 (2000) 141–190 155
It holds xi ∈ EXC(I,µ) if and only if there exists a clause δ that does not have I
as a model, that is minimally implied by µ, and contains xi . To express the fact that
xi /∈ EXC(I,µ) we have the following formula:
xi /∈ EXC(I,µ) iff ∀δ . (I 2 δ)∧ (µ  δ)∧ (∀δ′ ⊂ δ . µ 2 δ′)⇒ (xi /∈ Var(δ)).
Now we prove that xi ∈ FFN(µ[SI ]) if and only if xi /∈ EXC(I,µ). We prove first the
“only if part”, and then the “if” part.
xi ∈ FFN(µ[SI ])⇒ xi /∈ EXC(I,µ). Assume to the contrary that xi is free for negation
but is an exception. By definition we have
∀γ . (∅ 2 γ )∧ (µ[SI ] 2 γ )⇒ (µ[SI ] 2 γ ∨ xi),
∃δ . (I 2 δ)∧ (µ  δ)∧ (∀δ′ ⊂ δ . µ 2 δ′)∧ (xi ∈ Var(δ)).
Let δ be the clause of the latter formula. We know that xi is in δ, and since I 2 δ we also
know whether xi is positive or negated in δ. Assume without loss of generality that xi /∈ I .
This implies xi ∈ δ.
Now, let γ = δ[SI ]\{xi}. We have the following implications.
I 2 δ⇒∅ 2 δ[SI ] ⇒ ∅ 2 γ,
µ  δ⇒ µ[SI ]  γ ∨ xi,
∀δ′ ⊂ δ . µ 2 δ′ ⇒ µ[SI ] 2 γ.
They are contradictory by definition of xi being free for negation for µ[SI ].
The case xi ∈ I is similar. We have ¬xi ∈ δ, and define γ = δ[SI ]\{xi}: note that SI
contains xi/¬xi now. The rest of the proof is identical.
xi /∈ EXC(I,µ)⇒ xi ∈ FFN(µ[SI ]). Assume to the contrary that xi is not an exception
but is not free for negation. By definition we have:
∃γ . (∅ 2 γ )∧ (µ[SI ] 2 γ )∧ (µ[SI ]  γ ∨ xi),
∀δ . (I 2 δ)∧ (µ  δ)∧ (∀δ′ ⊂ δ . µ 2 δ′)⇒ (xi /∈ Var(δ)).
Let γ be the clause for which the first formula is true. Let δ = (γ ∨ xi)[SI ]. We have that
xi is positive in δ if xi /∈ I , negative otherwise. As a result,
∅ 2 γ ⇒ I 2 γ [SI ] ⇒ I 2 δ.
Moreover,
µ[SI ]  γ ∨ xi⇒ µ  δ.
Now, δ is a clause implied by µ that does not have I as a model. It may be not minimal. Let
δ′′ be a subset of δ that is minimal. It cannot be δ′′ ⊂ δ\{xi,¬xi}, since this would imply
that µ  γ .
As a result, δ′′ is a clause that has not I as a model, that is implied by µ and is minimal,
and contains xi . But since xi /∈ EXC(I,µ), the atom xi cannot be in any minimal clause
implied by µ that has not I as a model. 2
The following lemma gives a syntactic characterization of the Minimal Change with
Exception update.
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Lemma 2. If formula
µ∧
∧
{xi | xi /∈ EXC(I,µ), xi ∈ I } ∪ {¬xi | xi /∈ EXC(I,µ), xi /∈ I } (1)
is consistent, then Form(I) ∗MCE µ is equivalent to it.
Proof. The models of (1), if any, are those J that coincide with I for the value of the atoms
not in EXC(I,µ). Since Form(I) ∗MCE µ is obtained by selecting the models of µ with a
minimal difference to I on the atoms of X\EXC(I,µ), if there are models that coincide
with I over these atoms, they are exactly the minimal ones. 2
The next lemma is the bridge between ∗MCE and GCWA.
Lemma 3. Formula (1) is equivalent to GCWA(µ[SI ])[SI ].
Proof. Since X\EXC(I,µ)= FFN(µ[SI ]), where SI = {xi/¬xi | xi ∈ I }, we have
µ∧
∧
{xi | xi /∈ EXC(I,µ), xi ∈ I } ∪ {¬xi | xi /∈ EXC(I,µ), xi /∈ I }
= µ∧
∧
{xi | xi ∈ FFN(µ[SI ]), xi ∈ I } ∪ {¬xi | xi ∈ FFN(µ[SI ]), xi /∈ I }.






{xi | xi ∈ FFN(µ[SI ]), xi ∈ I }[SI ]







{¬xi | xi ∈ FFN(µ[SI ]), xi ∈ I }











This proves the claim. 2
From the above three lemmas we obtain the following theorem, relating ∗MCE and
GCWA when φ is a complete formula.
Theorem 4. For any model I and formula µ,
Form(I) ∗MCE µ=GCWA(µ[SI ])[SI ]
where SI = {xi/¬xi | xi ∈ I }.
Proof. If µ is inconsistent, then both φ ∗MCE µ and GCWA(µ[SI ])[SI ] are inconsistent.
Suppose µ consistent. Since (1) is equivalent to GCWA(µ[SI ])[SI ], it is consistent (we
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assumedµ to be consistent). Thus, by Lemma 2, we have that Form(I)∗MCEµ is equivalent
to (1), thus equivalent to GCWA(µ[SI ])[SI ]. 2
The following two theorems relate ∗MCE with GCWA.







Proof. The statement is a consequence of Theorem 4 when I = ∅. 2
This proves that the generalized closed world assumption can be reduced to MCE. The
converse also holds, i.e., we can express the minimal change with exceptions using GCWA.











Lemma 4 proved that Form(I) ∗MCE µ=GCWA(µ[SI ])[SI ], where SI = {xi/¬xi | xi ∈
I }. The claim follows. 2
This proves that ∗MCE can be expressed in terms of the generalized closed world
assumption. A consequence of the first theorem is that the update ∗MCE is 5p2-hard,
since the generalized closed world assumption is 5p2-hard [9], and it can be reduced in
polynomial time to ∗MCE . Membership in 5p2 cannot be proved using Theorem 6, as the
reduction is not polynomial. However, membership can be proved easily.
Theorem 7. The update ∗MCE is 5p2-complete.
Proof. The 5p2-hardness of MCE follows from Theorem 5 and from the fact that
entailment in GCWA is 5p2-hard.
Membership in 5p2 can be proved from the fact that deciding whether GCWA(µ) ψ is
in 5p2 [23]. As a result, the entailment GCWA(µ)  ψ can be expressed as a ∀∃QBF. De-
ciding whether φ ∗MCE µ  ψ amounts to verifying whether ∀I ∈Mod(φ) GCWA(µ[SI ])
[SI ] ψ . This is still a ∀∃QBF, thus the problem is in 5p2. 2
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6. Minimal change with maximal disjunctive inclusion
The update based on the principle of minimal change with maximal disjunctive inclusion
(MCD) employees another way to include some models that are not minimal in the updated
knowledge base. Consider the update of the Example 2, formalized as φ2 ∗W µ2, where
φ2 = x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3 and µ2 =¬x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3). The formula µ2 has three models: {x2},
{x3}, and {x2, x3}, and we are looking for a way to include the last one in the updated
k.b. although it is not a minimal one. Consider the relation 6{x1} between these models.
We have {x2} 6{x1} {x2, x3} and {x3} 6{x1} {x2, x3}. Furthermore, {x2, x3} is the minimal
model that is greater than both {x2} and {x3}. We define the updated k.b. as the formula
whose set of models is composed of:
(a) the models closest to φ; and
(b) the models that are least upper bounds of sets of closest models.
This way, some non-minimal models, such as {x2, x3}, are included in the result of the
update, avoiding the inclusion of all models of µ2 in the result.
Formally, the MCD update is based on the definition of the least upper bounds of a set
of models. Given a model I and a set of models S, define [30]:
Dis(I, S)=min({J ∈Mod(µ) | ∀Ii ∈ S it holds Ii 6I J },6I ).
The result of the update is defined as







Example 7. Consider again φ2 and µ2 of Example 2. Since {x1} is the only model of φ2
we have:








This set of models has three subsets, namely S1 = {{x2}}, S2 = {{x3}}, and S3 =
{{x2}, {x3}}. Let us determine Dis({x1}, S) for each of these subsets.
Dis({x1}, S1)= {{x2}},
Dis({x1}, S2)= {{x3}},
Dis({x1}, S3)= {{x2, x3}}.
As a result,
φ2 ∗MCD µ2 = Form({{x2}, {x3}, {x2, x3}} = ¬x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3).
We compute φ3 ∗MCD µ3, where φ3 and µ3 are defined in Example 6:
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φ3 =¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3 ∧¬x4,
µ3 = ((x1 6≡ x2)∧¬x3 ∧¬x4)∨ (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3).
The only model of φ3 is ∅. We determine Dis(∅, S). Note that Dis depends on µ3, since
its definition implicitly involves the considered update µ3. The minimal models of µ are




Dis(I, S3)= {{x1, x2, x3}}.
As a result,
φ3 ∗MCD µ3 = Form({{x1}, {x2}, {x1, x2, x3}}
= ((x1 6≡ x2)∧¬x3 ∧¬x4)∨ (x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧¬x4).
The example above shows also that φ3 ∗MCE µ3 6= φ3 ∗MCD µ3, that is, there are cases in
which ∗MCE and ∗MCD differ.
While the minimal change with exception is based on the generalized closed world
assumption, the minimal change with maximal disjunctive inclusion update is similar to
the variant of circumscription called CURB1 [10]. About the relation between ∗MCD and
CURB1, we have the following theorem.







Proof. Let us formally express J ∈Mod(Form(∅) ∗MCDµ) and J ∈Mod(CURB1(µ)). By
definition
J ∈Mod(CURB1(µ))
iff ∃S ⊆min(Mod(µ),⊆) . J ∈min(Ub(S,µ))
iff ∃S ⊆min(Mod(µ),⊆) . J ∈Ub(S,µ) ∧ @Z ∈Ub(S,µ) . Z ⊂ J
iff ∃S ⊆min(Mod(µ),⊆) . (∀K ∈ S . K ⊆ J )∧
@Z ∈Mod(µ) . (∀K ∈ S . K ⊆Z)∧Z ⊂ J.
Now let express J ∈Mod(Form(∅)∗MCDµ). Consider that Diff (∅, J )= J for any model
J , and that 6∅ is equal to ⊆.
J ∈Mod(Form(∅) ∗MCD µ)
iff ∃S ⊆min(Mod(µ),6∅) . (∀K ∈ S . Diff (∅,K)⊂Diff (∅, J ))∧
@Z ∈Mod(µ) . (∀K ∈ S . Diff (∅,K)⊂Diff (∅,Z))∧
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Diff (∅,Z)⊂Diff (∅, J )
iff ∃S ⊆min(Mod(µ),⊆) . (∀K ∈ S . K ⊆ J )∧
@Z ∈Mod(µ) . (∀K ∈ S . K ⊆Z)∧Z ⊂ J.
This formula coincides with the one expressing J ∈ CURB1(µ). As a result, CURB1(µ)
is equivalent to Form(∅) ∗MCD µ. 2
This theorem proves also that ∗MCD is 5p2-hard, since this is the complexity of CURB1,
as proved Eiter, Gottlob, and Gurevich [10]. It is also possible to prove the converse:
expressing the update using CURB1. We need a preliminary lemma.
Lemma 4. For any propositional formula µ and interpretation I it holds
Form(I) ∗MCD µ= CURB1(µ[SI ])[SI ],
where SI = {xi/¬xi | xi ∈ I }.
Proof. We prove the statement by showing that J ∈ (Form(I) ∗MCD µ)[SI ] if and only if
J ∈ CURB1(µ[SI ]). Since, for any formula ψ , the formula ψ[SI ][SI ] is equivalent to ψ ,
the claim follows.
Let us make some considerations about the correspondence between models of µ and
models of µ[SI ]. Let J be a model of µ, and let J ′ be the corresponding model of µ[SI ].
By definition, we have
J ′ = {xi | xi ∈ J, xi /∈ I } ∪ {xi | xi /∈ J, xi ∈ I } = J\I ∪ I\J =Diff (I, J ).
As a result, each model J of µ is mapped into the interpretation Diff (I, J ), which is a
model of µ[SI ]. Consider the definition of J ∈Mod((Form(I) ∗MCD µ)[SI ]). If J ′ is the
model corresponding to J according to the substitution SI , we have
J ∈min(Mod(µ),6I ) iff J ′ ∈min(Mod(µ[SI ]),⊆).
As a result, we have
J ∈Mod((Form(I) ∗MCD µ)[SI ])
iff ∃S ⊆min(Mod(µ),6I ) . (∀K ∈ S . Diff (I,K)⊆Diff (I, J ))∧
@Z . (∀K ∈ S . Diff (I,K)⊆Diff (I,Z))∧Diff (I,Z)⊂Diff (I, J )
iff ∃S ⊆min(Mod(µ[SI ]),⊆) . (∀K ∈ S . K ⊆ J )∧
@Z . (∀K ∈ S . K ⊆Z)∧Z ⊂ J.
This formula is identical to the definition of CURB1(µ[SI ]). 2
We are now able to prove the theorem expressing ∗MCD in terms of CURB1.
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where SI is the substitution {xi/¬xi |xi ∈ I }.





and, by Lemma 4, also Form(I) ∗MCD µ= CURB1(µ[SI ])[SI ] where SI = {xi/¬xi |xi ∈
I }. The claim follows. 2
This second reduction is not polynomial. However, with a little effort it is possible to
obtain the exact complexity of ∗MCD.
Theorem 10. The update ∗MCD is 5p2-complete.
Proof. The problem of deciding whether CURB1(µ)  ψ is 5p2-complete. The update∗MCD has the same complexity: the proof is similar to that of Theorem 7, where ∗MCE
is replaced by ∗MCD and GCWA by CURB1. 2
7. Update with dependence function
This is the last update considered in this paper that has been proposed to solve the
problem of disjunctive update. Whereas the MCD and MCE updates depends only on
the k.b. φ and the updating formula µ, the update with dependence function requires the
knowledge of which variables may change as a side effect of the change of another variable.
Consider the update of Example 2. Let x1 = contains(Cards,R1), x2 = contains
(Cards,R2), and x3 = contains(Cards,R3). Clearly, the fact that some cards are in
room R2 may affect the fact that R3 contains cards. For example, x2 may become true
because all cards in R1 are moved to R2, thus updating a k.b. with x2 may have as a side
effect the change of x3. This dependence between variables is expresses with a function
DEP from atoms to set of atoms, where x3 ∈ DEP(x2) means that a change in the truth
value of x2 caused by an update may change the value of x3.
The operator of update with dependence function has been introduced by Herzig [13].
We refer to his paper for more details. It is assumed that, for any atom xi , it holds
xi ∈DEP(xi) since changing xi affects the value of xi .
When the update is a literal, i.e., either µ = xi or µ = ¬xi , the variables whose value
may change are those in DEP(xi). When the update is not atomic, we have to define which
variables may change. Let µ be the update. All variables in Var(µ)may change their value.







CTX(µ)= {l1 ∧ · · · ∧ lk | li = xi or ¬xi, and xi ∈DEP(µ)}.
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This is the set of conjunctions of (possibly negated) variables in DEP(µ). Intuitively,
each conjunction represents a possible scenario after the change, disregarding variables not
in DEP(µ). If µ = x1 is the update, and DEP(x1) = {x1, x2}, then the possible scenarios
after the change are x1 ∧ x2, x1 ∧ ¬x2, ¬x1 ∧ x2 and ¬x1 ∧ ¬x2. The last two ones are
ruled out by the fact that µ= x1 is true after the change.




(φ ∗W γ )∧µ.
This definition takes into account the fact that not all conjunctions in CTX(µ) are really
possible according to the value of µ.
Example 8. Let us see how Herzig’s update behave on the knowledge base and the update
defined in Example 2. The knowledge base can be defined as φ2 = x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3, while
the update is µ2 =¬x1∧(x2∨x3). We begin with the simple case in which DEP(xi)= {xi}
for each xi . We have DEP(µ2)= {x1, x2, x3}. As a result,
CTX(µ2)= {x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3, x1 ∧ x2 ∧¬x3, x1 ∧¬x2 ∧ x3, x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3,
¬x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3,¬x1 ∧ x2 ∧¬x3,¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧ x3,¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3}.
Thus we conclude
φ2 ∗He µ2 =
[
(φ ∗W x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3)∨ (φ ∗W x1 ∧ x2 ∧¬x3)∨
(φ ∗W x1 ∧¬x2 ∧ x3)∨ (φ ∗W x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3)∨
(φ ∗W ¬x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3)∨ (φ ∗W ¬x1 ∧ x2 ∧¬x3)∨
(φ ∗W ¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧ x3)∨ (φ ∗W ¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3)
]∧ (x1 ∨ x2)
= [(x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3)∨ (x1 ∧ x2 ∧¬x3)∨
(x1 ∧¬x2 ∧ x3)∨ (x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3)∨
(¬x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3)∨ (¬x1 ∧ x2 ∧¬x3)∨
(¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧ x3)∨ (¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3)
]∧ (x1 ∨ x2)
= (x1 ∨ x2).
The following example shows that the result of the update depends on the function DEP.
Let φ4 and µ4 be defined as follows.
φ4 =¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3 ∧¬x4, µ4 = x1 ∨ x2.
We first assume that DEP(xi)= {xi} for all variables xi . The result of updating φ4 with
µ4 is determined as in the previous case: since DEP(µ4)= Var(µ4)= {x1, x2}, we have
CTX(µ4)= {x1 ∧ x2, x1 ∧¬x2,¬x1 ∧ x2,¬x1 ∧¬x2}.
Thus we conclude
φ4 ∗He µ4 =
[
(φ4 ∗W x1 ∧ x2)∨ (φ4 ∗W x1 ∧¬x2)∨
(φ4 ∗W ¬x1 ∧ x2)∨ (φ4 ∗W ¬x1 ∧¬x2)
]∧ (x1 ∨ x2)
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= [(x1 ∧ x2 ∧¬x3 ∧¬x4)∨ (x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3 ∧¬x4)∨
(¬x1 ∧ x2 ∧¬x3 ∧¬x4)∨ (¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3 ∧¬x4)
]∧ (x1 ∨ x2)
= (x1 ∨ x2)∧¬x3 ∧¬x4.
Consider now the case DEP(xi)= {x1, x2, x3, x4}. We have DEP(µ4)= {x1, x2, x3, x4},
thus CTX(µ4) is the set of all conjunctions of literals that contain all atoms. Since the
considered γ ’s are complete formulae, we have φ ∗W γ = γ . We can conclude that:
φ4 ∗He µ4 =
∨
γ∈CTX(µ)




A useful equivalent formulation of the update with dependence function is given by the
following theorem, which shows that this update operator can be seen as an extension of
the standard semantics.
Theorem 11. For any φ, µ, and DEP, it holds
Mod(φ ∗He µ)= {J ∈Mod(µ) | ∃I ∈Mod(φ) . I\DEP(µ)= J\DEP(µ)}.
Proof. Let J be a model of φ ∗He µ. By definition, J  µ, and there exists γ ∈ CTX(µ)
such that J  φ ∗W γ . Using Winslett’s definition, we have
J ∈Mod(φ ∗He µ) iff J ∈Mod(µ) and
∃I ∈Mod(φ) ∃γ ∈ CTX(µ) . J ∈Mod(Form({I }) ∗W γ ).
By definition of Winslett’s update, Form({I }) ∗W γ have only one model if γ is a
conjunction of literals, and precisely
Mod(Form({I }) ∗W γ )= {I\Var(γ )∪ {xi | γ  xi}}.
As a result, the above equivalence can be rewritten as:
J ∈Mod(φ ∗He µ) iff J  µ and ∃I ∈Mod(φ)
∃γ ∈ CTX(µ) . J = I\Var(γ )∪ {xi | γ  xi}
iff J  µ and ∃I ∈Mod(φ)
∃γ ∈ CTX(µ) . J\Var(γ )= I\Var(γ ) and
γ =
∧
{xi | xi ∈ J, xi ∈DEP(µ)}∧∧
{¬xi | xi /∈ J, xi ∈DEP(µ)}
iff J  µ and ∃I ∈Mod(φ) . J\Var(γ )= I\Var(γ )
iff J  µ and ∃I ∈Mod(φ) . J\DEP(µ)= I\DEP(µ).
The quantification over γ can be removed because γ can be defined from J in such a
way it is a conjunction of literals over the variables DEP(µ). 2
The update with dependence function is based on a function DEP that represents the
causal relations between literals of the given alphabet. The simplest case is when literals
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are independent from each other, that is DEP(xi) = {xi}. In this case, the above theorem
shows that Herzig’s proposal coincides with the standard semantics ∗SSU .
Corollary 12. If DEP(xi)= {xi} for each xi , then for each pair of propositional formulae
φ and µ it holds φ ∗He µ= φ ∗SSU µ.
A more general statement, extending Theorem 1, follows from Theorem 11.





where SI is the substitution {xi/¬xi | xi ∈ I } and NDEP is defined as NDEP(µ) =
µ∧ {¬xi | xi /∈DEP(µ)}.
Recall that a way to represent the logical consequences of φ ∗SSU µ is φ[{xi/zi |xi ∈
Var(µ)}] ∧µ, where zi are new variables appearing nowhere else [6,27]. For ∗He we have
the following lemma.
Lemma 5. For each triple of propositional formulae φ, µ and ψ , it holds
φ ∗He µ ψ iff φ[{xi/zi |xi ∈DEP(µ)}] ∧µ ψ,
where zi ’s are variables that do not appear in any of the three formulae.
Proof. We divide the proof in two steps. We first prove the “if” direction and then the
“only if” direction.
φ[{xi/zi |xi ∈DEP(µ)}] ∧µ  ψ⇒ φ ∗He µ  ψ . Suppose J  φ ∗He µ. We prove that
J ψ . By definition, J  φ ∗He µ is
J ∈Mod(φ ∗He µ) iff J ∈Mod(µ) and ∃I ∈Mod(φ) such that
I\DEP(µ)= J\DEP(µ).
As a result,
J ∪ {zi | xi ∈DEP(µ)∩ I }  φ[{xi/zi |xi ∈DEP(µ)}] ∧µ
and, by hypothesis, any model of φ[{xi/zi |xi ∈DEP(µ)}] ∧µ is also a model of ψ . Since
ψ does not contain any zi ’s, we conclude that J ψ .
φ ∗He µ  ψ⇒ φ[{xi/zi |xi ∈ DEP(µ)}] ∧µ  ψ . Let K be a model of φ[. . .] ∧ µ. We
prove that K ψ . Let
I =K ∩ (X\DEP(µ))∪ {xi | zi ∈K},
J =K ∩X.
We have I  φ and J  µ. We prove that J  φ ∗He µ. Indeed, I and J are models of φ
and µ, respectively, and they coincide for the variables not in DEP(µ). This implies that
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J  φ ∗He µ, which in turns implies that J  ψ . Since ψ is built over the variables X, and
J and K gives the same truth value to variables in X, it follows that K ψ . 2
Assuming that verifying whether xi ∈ DEP(µ) is a polynomial task, we have the
following result.
Theorem 14. If verifying whether xj ∈ DEP(xi) is polynomial, then the update with
dependence function is co-NP-complete.
Proof. Hardness follows from the fact that ψ is valid if and only if true ∗He true ψ .
To check whether φ ∗He µ 2ψ , guess a modelK of φ[{xi/zi |xi ∈DEP(µ)}] ∧µ that is
not a model of ψ . If this is possible, then the updated k.b. does not imply ψ . 2
This result can be extended to the case in which deciding whether xj ∈ DEP(xi) is in
NP. We need two preliminary lemmata.
Lemma 6. Let ∗D be the binary operator defined as
Mod
(
φ ∗D µ)= {J | J ∈Mod(µ) and ∃I ∈Mod(φ) such that I\D = J\D}
If D1 ⊆D2 then it holds Mod(φ ∗D1 µ)⊆Mod(φ ∗D2 µ).
Proof. A model J of µ is in Mod(φ ∗D1 µ) if and only if there exists I ∈Mod(φ) such
that J\D1 = I\D1. Since D1 ⊆D2 it follows that J\D2 = I\D2. 2
Lemma 7. φ ∗He µ ψ if and only if φ ∗D µ ψ for any D ⊆ DEP(µ).
Proof. If φ ∗D µ  ψ for any D ⊆DEP(µ) then it follows that φ ∗DEP(µ) µ ψ which is
equivalent to φ ∗He µ ψ .
Let us prove the converse: assume φ ∗He µ  ψ , and prove that φ ∗D µ  ψ holds
for any D ⊆ DEP(µ). This is an easy consequence of the above lemma. Indeed, since
D ⊆DEP(µ) it follows that
Mod
(
φ ∗D µ)⊆Mod(φ ∗DEP(µ) µ)=Mod(φ ∗He µ).
As a result, if φ ∗He µ ψ then φ ∗D µ ψ . 2
The above two lemmas allow for proving the complexity of the update with dependence
function in the case in which DEP is a function in NP.
Theorem 15. If verifying whether xj ∈DEP(xi) is in NP, then the update with dependence
function is co-NP-complete.
Proof. Since xj ∈DEP(xi) is in NP, also xj ∈DEP(µ) is in NP, andD ⊆DEP(µ) is also
in NP for any D ⊆X. Now, φ ∗He µ ψ is equivalent to
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φ ∗He µ ψ iff ∀D ⊆DEP(µ) . φ ∗D µ ψ
iff ∀D ⊆DEP(µ) . ∀J ∈Mod(φ ∗D µ) . J ∈Mod(ψ)
iff ∀D ⊆DEP(µ) . ∀J . (∃I . I ∈Mod(φ) and I\D = J\D)
⇒ J ∈Mod(ψ)
iff ∀D ⊆DEP(µ) ∀J ∀I . I /∈Mod(φ)∨
(I\D 6= J\D)∨ J ∈Mod(ψ)
iff ∀D ∀J ∀I . D 6⊆DEP(µ)∨ I /∈Mod(φ)∨
(I\D 6= J\D)∨ J ∈Mod(ψ).
Since D ⊆ DEP(µ) is in NP, it follows that the converse problem D 6⊆ DEP(µ) is in
co-NP, thus it can be reduced to a ∀QBF. As a result, the whole formula above is a ∀QBF,
thus the problem is in co-NP. 2
8. Consistency and iteration of CWA-based updates
All update semantics considered in the previous sections can be reformulated in a general
way. Let OP be a function from boolean formulae to boolean formulae. Suppose that an





where SI = {xi/¬xi | xi ∈ I }. When OP is CIRC, GCWA, and CURB1 we have the updates
∗W , ∗MCE , and ∗MCD, respectively. When OP is NVAR and NDEP we have the standard
semantics update and the update with dependence function, respectively.
We consider the problem of consistency for this kind of updates.
Theorem 16. If OP(µ) is consistent if and only if µ is consistent, then φ ∗µ is consistent
if and only if both φ and µ are consistent.
Proof. Suppose that both φ and µ are consistent. Let I ∈Mod(φ). We have
Mod(OP(µ[SI ])[SI ])⊆Mod(φ ∗µ).
Since µ is consistent, then µ[SI ] is consistent. Thus, OP(µ[SI ])[SI ] is also consistent.
As a result, φ ∗µ have models.
Suppose φ unsatisfiable. By definition, φ ∗ µ does not have models. Suppose µ
unsatisfiable. Then, for each I ∈ Mod(φ), we have that OP(µ[SI ])[SI ] is inconsistent.
Thus φ ∗µ is inconsistent. 2
An immediate corollary of this property is the NP-completeness of checking consistency
of these update operators.
Corollary 17. Checking consistency of φ ∗ µ, given φ and µ, is NP-complete, where
∗ ∈ {∗SSU,∗W ,∗MCD,∗MCE,∗He}.
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Proof. All considered update operators can be expressed, using Theorem 16, with an
operator OP that is consistent on exactly the consistent formulae. Membership: φ ∗ µ is
consistent if and only if φ[{xi/yi}]∧µ is satisfiable (where yi’s are new variables appearing
nowhere else). Hardness: µ is satisfiable if and only if true ∗µ is consistent. 2
Let us now consider the problem of the iterated update:
(· · · (φ ∗µ1) ∗ · · ·) ∗µm ψ?
If deciding whether J  OP(µ) is in 6p2 , given µ and J , then we can prove that the
above problem is in 5p2.





where SI = {xi/¬xi | xi ∈ I }, and OP is an operator from boolean formulae to boolean
formulae, such that deciding whether an interpretation is a model of OP(µ) is in 6p2 . The
problem of iterated update is in 5p2.
Proof. Consider the problem of deciding which interpretations are models of an updated
k.b. By definition, M  φ ∗µ can be expressed as
M  φ ∗µ iff ∃I . (I  φ)∧ (M OP(µ[SI ])[SI ]).
Let us assume m= 2, that is, a sequence of two updates only. By definition, we have
M  (φ ∗µ1) ∗µ2 iff ∃J . (J  φ ∗µ1)∧ (M OP(µ2[SJ ])[SJ ])
iff ∃J . [∃I . (I  φ)∧ (J OP(µ1[SI ])[SI ])]∧
(M OP(µ2[SJ ])[SJ ])
iff ∃I, J . (I  φ)∧ (J OP(µ1[SI ])[SI ])∧
(M OP(µ2[SJ ])[SJ ]).
Since J  OP(ψ) is in 6p2 for any formula ψ , it follows that it can be expressed as a∃∀QBF. As a result, the whole formula can be expressed as ∃I, J.Q, whereQ is a ∃∀QBF.
This is still a ∃∀QBF.
This result can be generalized to sequences of m updates: M  ((φ ∗ µ1) · · · ∗ µm)
holds if and only if there exists a model J such that J  (φ ∗ µ1) · · · ∗ µm−1 and
M  OP(µm[SJ ])[SJ ]. Applying this rule recursively on J  ((φ ∗ µ1) · · · ∗ µm−1, we
can express the membership of M to the result of the update as a ∃∀QBF formula.
Deciding whether a formula is implied by the updated k.b. amounts to deciding
∀M . M 2 (· · · (φ ∗µ1) ∗ · · ·) ∗µm or M ψ.
As a result, this is a ∀∃QBF, thus the problem of entailment is in 5p2. 2
A similar statement can be proven for operators OP whose model checking is in NP.
Namely, it can be shown that their iterated query answering is in co-NP.
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As a simple corollary, since the problem J OP(ψ) is 6p2 for the considered operators,
we can conclude that the problem of iterated update is in 5p2 for all these operators.
Hardness is also easy to prove for ∗W , ∗MCE, and ∗MCD, since these operators are 5p2
hard even when m= 1.
Theorem 19. The problem of deciding whether
(· · · (φ ∗µ1) ∗ · · ·) ∗µm ψ
is 5p2-complete, for ∗ ∈ {∗W,∗MCE,∗MCD}.
A statement similar to Theorem 18 can be proven for operators OP whose model
checking is in NP: the iterated query answering for the corresponding update operators
is in co-NP. As a result, we have the complexity of the standard semantics and the update
with dependence function.
Theorem 20. The problem of deciding whether
(· · · (φ ∗µ1) ∗ · · ·) ∗µm ψ
is co-NP-complete, for ∗ ∈ {∗SSU,∗He}.
9. Abduction-based update
The rationale of the abduction-based update, introduced by Boutilier [5], is that the
events that change the world can be modeled by an abductive semantics.
Let us explain the idea using Example 2. During the fire, the cards are moved, thus three
events may have taken place:
(1) all the cards are moved from room R1 to room R2;
(2) they have been moved from R1 to R3;
(3) some cards have been moved from R1 to R2 and some from R1 to R3.
Some events may be considered to be more likely than others. To explain the change, we
choose the most likely ones. For example, if the event in which the cards have been moved
to both rooms is the most likely one, the result is that now both rooms contain cards. If
the three events are equally likely, then the result is that at least one of the rooms contains
cards.
On the other hand, if for some reason we believe that all the cards have been moved
together, then the first two events are more likely than the third one. The result of the
update is thus that exactly one room contains cards.
Note an interesting feature of this idea. Following Winslett’s approach, the result is that
exactly one room contains cards, while the other semantics imply that at least one room
have cards in it. Using the abduction-based update one can choose one alternative or the
other one just by properly setting the degree of plausibility of the events.
Since the outcome of events, and their plausibility, are needed to actually compute the
update, the current knowledge base ψ and the update µ do not suffice to determine the
updated k.b. This kind of updates, in which some extra information is required, is called
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update schema. It can be viewed as a family of updates, one for each set of events and
plausibility ordering. Specifying the events and their plausibility is equivalent to selecting
a specific update of the family.
We now give the formal definition of the update. A more detailed explanation can be
found in the paper where this update is introduced [5]. In order to explain changes, we have
a set of events E. Each event e is a function from interpretations to sets of interpretations.
Thus, for each interpretation I , e(I) is a set of interpretations, and J ∈ e(I) means that the
possible world represented by the interpretation J is one of the possible outcomes of the
event e, if this event occurs in the scenario represented by the interpretation I . An event e
is said to be deterministic if e(I) is always composed of a single interpretation.
As seen in the informal explanation above, not all events are considered equally
plausible. To represent the relative plausibility of events we have a family of preorders
O = {I | I ∈M}, one for each interpretation I . By e I s we mean that the event e is
considered more likely to happen than s in the scenario represented by the interpretation
I . We denote by e≺I s the fact that e is strictly more likely than s, that is, e I s holds but
s I e does not.
Let φ be the current k.b. and µ the update. The set of explanations of µ is the set of
events whose occurrence can explain the fact that µ is now true. There are two possible
definitions.
Definition 3. Given a set of events E and a family of preorders O , the set of weak
explanations of µ is
Expl(I,µ)=min({e | e(I)∩Mod(µ) 6= ∅},I ).
The set of predictive explanations of µ is
Explp(I,µ)=min
({e | e(I)⊆Mod(µ)},I ).
In the sequel, where not otherwise specified, we assume the use of weak explanations.
The outcome of the update is defined in terms of the progression of a possible world I .
Definition 4. The progression of an interpretation I is the set
Prog(I,µ)=
⋃
{e(I)∩Mod(µ) | e ∈ Expl(I,µ)}.
The progression of an interpretation is defined in the same way for predictive
explanations. The updated k.b. is defined as the union of the progression of all models
of the knowledge base.
Definition 5. The result of updating φ with µ is 2
φ ∗ABD µ= Form
(⋃
{Prog(I,µ) | I ∈Mod(φ)}
)
.
2 In the original Boutilier’s definition, the update is inconsistent if there is an I ∈Mod(φ) such that Prog(I,µ)
is empty. For simplicity, we neglect this situation.
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In this definition we assume the use of the weak explanations. A similar definition can
be given using predictive explanations instead. We apply the abduction-based update to
Example 2.
Example 9. Consider the situation of Example 2. The initial k.b. is φ2 = x1 ∧¬x2 ∧¬x3,
thus it has an unique model I = {x1}. The update is µ2 =¬x1 ∧ (x2 ∨ x3).
In order to update φ2, we must specify the set of events and their plausibility. There are
three possible events.
e1: all cards are moved to room R2;
e2: all cards are moved to room R3;
e3: some cards are moved to R2 and some to R3.
Thus E = {e1, e2, e3}. Each event is a function from interpretations to sets of
interpretations. Since the initial k.b. has only one model {x1} we only need to specify




That is, the effect of moving all cards to R2 is the interpretation in which x2 is true and
x3 is not, etc. We also have to specify the family of preorders that represent the plausibility
of events. Again, since φ has only one model, the ordering {x1} suffices. Assume that the
three events are equally plausible. We have:
Expl({x1},µ2)= {e1, e2, e3}.






{{{x2}}, {{x3}}, {{x2, x3}}}
= {{x2}, {x3}, {x2, x3}}.
As a result, we have
φ2 ∗ABD µ2 = Form
(⋃
{Prog(I,µ2) | I ∈Mod(φ2)}
)
= Form(Prog({x1},µ2))
= Form({{x2}, {x3}, {x2, x3}})
= x2 ∨ x3.
This is indeed the expected result of the update. Let us now consider the case in which
we know that all cards has been moved together (for example, there were only few cards,
all in a big container, and thus it is most likely that the container is moved with everything
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inside.) In this case, the event e3 is less likely than the other ones, that is, e1 ≺{x1} e3 and
e2 ≺{x1} e3, thus:
Expl({x1},µ2)= {e1, e2}.
Thus the progression of {x1} is
Prog({x1},µ2)= {{x2}, {x3}}.
The result of the update is easy to compute.
φ2 ∗ABD µ2 = Form(Prog({x1},µ))= x1 ∧ (x2 6≡ x3).
This is indeed the expected result, when we assume that all cards have been moved
together. Note that the only difference with respect to the previous case is the use of
a different ordering {x1}. All updates defined in the previous sections have an unique
semantics, thus they cannot handle both scenarios.
As proved by Boutilier [5], any update obeying Katsuno and Mendelzon’s [17]
postulates can be reformulated as an abduction-based update, with a suitable choice of
the set of events and their plausibility. We show some computational properties of this
translation. Namely, we prove that, in order to reduce Winslett’s update (which obeys all
Katsuno and Mendelzon’s postulates) to the abductive update, an exponentially large set
of events is needed.
Theorem 21. There exists a pair of propositional formulae φ and µ such that φ ∗W µ=
φ ∗ABD µ holds only if the set of events is exponentially large.
Proof. LetM be the set of all interpretations, andM1 be the set of interpretations having
exactly one true atom. We prove that, for each interpretation I ∈M\M1, there exists at
least one event e such that I is the only maximal element of e(∅)\M1. This implies that
an exponential number of events is required, since there must be at least one event for each
element inM\M1, and this set contains an exponential number of interpretations.
More precisely, we prove that, for any interpretation I there exists an event e ∈
Expl(∅,Form({I })) such that e(∅) is composed only of:
(1) the interpretation I ;
(2) some interpretations J such that J ⊆ I ;
(3) some interpretations ofM1.
Let us assume, on the contrary, that for all e ∈ Expl(∅,Form({I })) there exists an
interpretation K ∈ e(∅) such that:
(1) K 6⊆ I ; and
(2) K /∈M1.
Let us define φ and µ as follows:
φ = Form({∅}),
MI1 = {J ∈M1 | J 6⊆ I },
N = {K ∈M\M1 |K 6⊆ I, ∃e ∈ Expl(∅,Form({I })) . K ∈ e(∅)},
µ= Form({I } ∪MI1 ∪N ).
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Fig. 1. The models of the proof of Theorem 21.
Fig. 1 shows the relationships between the involved models. First of all, I  φ ∗W µ.
This holds because no model of µ is strictly contained in I , and ⊆ coincide with ∅ by
definition. Moreover, for each K ∈ N , it holds K 2 φ ∗W µ. Indeed, K 6⊆ I implies that
there exists xi such that xi ∈ K and xi /∈ I . From xi ∈ K it follows that {xi} ⊆ K , and
since K is not inM1 it must have at least two true variables, thus {xi} ⊂K . From xi /∈ I
it follows that {xi} ∈MI1. As a result, we have {xi} ≺∅ K and, since {xi} ∈Mod(µ), the
interpretation K is not a model of the updated knowledge base.
We have proved that I  φ ∗W µ and Mod(φ ∗W µ) ∩ N = ∅. We can also prove
that I  φ ∗W µ implies that there exists K ∈ N such that K  φ ∗W µ, thus reaching
a contradiction.
From I  φ ∗ABD µ it follows that there exists an event e such that I ∈ e(∅) and e ∈
Expl(∅,µ). This implies e ∈ Expl(∅,Form({I })), because the events such that e(∅)∩{I } 6=
∅ are a subset of the events such that e(∅) ∩ µ 6= ∅ (thus minimality is preserved). By
assumption, from e ∈ Expl(∅,Form({I })) it follows that there exists at least one K ∈ N
such that K  φ ∗ABD µ.
So far, we have proved that, for each interpretation I ∈M\M1, there exists an event e
such that e(∅) has I as its only maximal element (besides the elements ofM1). As a result,
each interpretation inM\M1 is associated with an event, that must be different from the
ones associated with the other interpretations. As a result, the total number of events must
be exponential.
The proof for the predictive abduction-based update (which uses Explp instead of Expl)
is even simpler: for each interpretation I it must be
Form({∅}) ∗W Form({I })= Form({I }).
As a result, there must be an event e such that e(∅)= {I }. Since there are exponentially
many interpretations, there are exponentially many events. 2
The following theorem expresses Winslett’s update as abduction-based update, using an
exponential number of events.
Theorem 22. Let E = {eD |D ⊆X}, where eD(I)= {D\I ∪ I\D} and X is the set of all
variables. Let the plausibility of events be defined as eD I eD′ if and only if D ⊆D′, for
each I . Then, for each pair of propositional formulae φ and µ it holds
φ ∗ABD µ= φ ∗W µ.
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Proof. Trivial. 2
Note that since e(I) is always a singleton, Expl and Explp always coincide. Thus the
theorem holds both for weak and predictive explanations. Since the reduction requires an
exponential number of events, it cannot be used for deriving complexity results in the
polynomial hierarchy.
On the other hand, it is easy to show that the update defined by Forbus [11] can be
expressed using a polynomial number of events. Forbus’ update has not been introduced
so far because of its similarity with Winslett’s one: the only difference is that J 6I Z if
and only if |Diff (I, J )| 6 |Diff (I,Z)|. In other words, we consider the number of atoms
on which two interpretations differ as the measure of their distance.
Theorem 23. Let E = {ei | 1 6 i 6 |X|}, where ei(I ) = {J | |Diff (I, J )| 6 i}. For each
interpretation I , the plausibility I is defined as ei I ej if and only if i 6 j . Then, for
each pair of propositional formulae φ and µ it holds
φ ∗ABD µ= φ ∗F µ
where ∗F is Forbus’ update.
Proof. Trivial. 2
Now we consider the computational properties of abduction-based update. Two
problems are of interest.
Explainability: Deciding whether there is an I ∈ Mod(φ) such that Expl(I,µ) is non-
empty.
Query answering: Deciding whether φ ∗ABD µ ψ .
As said above, the abduction-based update is not a single update but rather a family of
update operators, one for each set of events and plausibility ordering. As a result, there are
two possible ways to consider E and O in the study of complexity:
(1) E and O are fixed: in other words, we are selecting a specific update operator
∗ABD, and studying the complexity of explainability given φ and µ as input, and
the problem of inference given φ, µ, and ψ as inputs;
(2) E andO are part of the input: in this case, the problem of explainability is: given E,
O , φ, and µ, decide whether µ is explainable, while the problem of inference is to
decide, given E, O , φ, µ, and ψ , whether ψ is implied by the updated knowledge
base.
In case (1) we have not a single update operator, but rather a family of operators, one for
each choice of E and O . As shown below, the complexity of these operators greatly differ.
In case (2), there is still a choice to make: how to represent the events and the family of
orderings. We consider two ways of representation of these sets.
Enumerative: The set E is represented by a set of event names. For each event e we
enumerate the interpretations in the set e(I). For each I , we also give the set of pairs 〈e, s〉
such that eI s holds.
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Polynomial: A natural assumption to make is that checking whether J ∈ e(I) and e I s
is polynomial in the number of variables, and that the number of events is polynomial as
well. This allows for a representation of E and O using circuits. Namely, E is still a set
of event names, but each event e is represented by a circuit having 2n input gates and 1
output gate, n being the number of variables. This circuit gives 1 as output if and only if
J ∈ e(I), where I is the interpretations represented by the truth value of the first n input
gates, while J corresponds to the input gates n+ 1, . . . ,2n. A similar representation can
be used for the family of orderingsO .
We begin considering the complexity in the case in which E and O are fixed. The
complexity, in this case, depends on the choice of the events and orderings. Then, we
consider the complexity in the case in which E and O are part of the input, both
in the enumerative and polynomial representations. We also show that the enumerative
representation is in most cases not reasonable.
9.1. Fixed set of events and orderings
When E and O are considered fixed, we have a specific update operators for each
possible choice of E and O . It is easy to establish a lower bound by considering the
simplest possible update operator: there exist E andO such that checking explainability is
polynomial. A similar result holds for inference: there exist E andO such that φ ∗ABD µ 
ψ is polynomial. This proves that there areE andO that makes the update computationally
simple.
9.1.1. Weak explanation
Let us now consider some more interesting results. It is easy to prove that there exists E
and O such that deciding the explainability of µ with respect to φ is NP-hard (using weak
explanations). The problem of inference using weak explanation is more complex.
Theorem 24. There exists O and E (with |E| = 2) such that the problem of deciding
whether φ ∗ABD µ ψ is 5p2-hard (weak explanations).
Proof. Using the set of events E and the family of orderings O as in Theorem 23, the
selected update operator is equivalent to Forbus’ revision, which is 5p2-hard.
We can strengthen this result by showing that the result holds using two events only.
Indeed, let F be a propositional formula over the variables X ∪ Y . Then, ∃X∀Y.F is valid
if and only if J  φ ∗ABD µ, where
φ =∧{¬yi | yi ∈ Y } ∧ ¬r,
µ= (¬F ∧¬r)∨ (∧(X ∪ Y ∪ {r})),
J =X ∪ Y ∪ {r},
E = {e1, e2},
e1(I)= {J } for any I,
e2(I)= {K |K ∩ (X ∪ {r})= I ∩ (X ∪ {r})},
 : e2 ≺I e1 for each I.
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No model of φ contains r , while J does. As a result, J /∈ e2(I) for any I ∈ Mod(φ).
Since J ∈ e1(I) for any I , it holds J  φ ∗ABD µ if and only if there exists I ∈ Mod(φ)
such that e2(I) ∩Mod(µ) = ∅. Moreover, since no model of φ contains r , it follows that
no model of e2(I) contains r , thus
e2(I) ∩Mod(µ)= e2(I)∩Mod(¬F ∧¬r).






{¬xi | xi ∈X\I } ∧ ¬F ∧¬r
)
.
As a result, e2(I) ∩Mod(µ) = ∅ if and only if, for the truth evaluation of X given by
I , formula F is true. By definition of φ, its models are exactly the truth evaluations of the
variables in X. As a result, J  φ ∗ABD µ if and only if there exists a truth evaluation of the
variables in X such that formula F is valid.
The proof of hardness is an easy consequence of the argumentation above. Since J is
the only model of µ containing r , it holds φ ∗ABD µ ¬r if and only if J 2 φ ∗ABD µ. 2
Finding upper bounds on complexity is not trivial. If we allow any set of events E,
the problem is of arbitrary complexity. For instance, if we encode some Turing-machine
termination checking in a single event e, we are able to solve undecidable problems using
∗ABD. A natural assumption is that checking whether J ∈ e(I) is a polynomial problem for
any pair of interpretations I and J , and that checking whether e I s is polynomial in the
size of I .
Theorem 25. If both E and O are polynomial, the problem of checking whether µ is
explainable with respect to φ is in NP (weak explanations).
Proof. The problem of explainability amounts to verifying whether there exists a model I
of φ, an event e, and a model J of µ such that J ∈ e(I) and J ∈Mod(µ). Since verifying
whether I ∈ Mod(φ), J ∈ Mod(µ) and J ∈ Mod(µ) are polynomial by hypothesis, the
problem of explainability is in NP. 2
Theorem 26. If both E and O are polynomial, the problem of checking whether φ ∗ABD
µ ψ is in 5p2 (weak explanations).
Proof. φ ∗ABD µ 2ψ can be proved by guessing a model I and an explanation e such that
• e(I)∩Mod(µ) 6= ∅;
• for each e′ such that e′ ≺I e the above property does not hold;
• e(I) 6⊆Mod(ψ).
Note thatE, being fixed, is composed of a constant number of events. Since J ∈ e(I) is a
polynomial problem, it follows that e(I)∩Mod(µ) 6= ∅ and e(I) 6⊆Mod(ψ) are problems
in NP. As a result, the problem can be solved by a single guessing and a constant number
of calls to an NP oracle, thus it is in 6p2 . Since query answering is the complement of this
problem, it is in 5p2. 2
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From these results it is easy to conclude that there are polynomial E and O such that
explainability is NP-complete, and for another pair E and O inference is 5p2-complete.
9.1.2. Predictive explanation
Regarding predictive explanations, it can be proved that a suitable pair E and O allows
proving the 6p2 -hardness of the problem of explainability.
The complexity of query answering using predictive explanations can be easily shown
to be 5p2-hard (that is, there exist E and O such that the problem is 5
p
2-hard).
An easy upper bound on complexity is obtained in the case in which events and orderings
are polynomial: deciding explainability using predictive explanations is in 6p2 . A similar
result (membership in 5p2) can be proved for inference.
Theorem 27. If events and orderings are polynomial, deciding whether φ ∗ABD µ  ψ is
in 5p2 (predictive explanations).
Proof. Determining whether φ ∗ABD µ 2 ψ can be done as follows: guess a model
I ∈Mod(φ), an event e, a model J ∈ e(I), and then check whether:
(1) J /∈Mod(ψ);
(2) for all K ∈ e(I) it holds K ∈Mod(µ); and
(3) the above condition is not valid for any s such that s ≺I e.
Condition (1) is polynomial, while condition (2) requires a call to an NP oracle.
Condition (3) can be checked calling an NP oracle for each event: since the number of
events is constant, these three condition can be checked with a constant number of calls to
an NP oracle, thus the problem of deciding whether φ ∗ABD µ 2 ψ is in 6p2 . The problem
of inference is its complementary, thus it is in 5p2. 2
9.2. Varying events and orderings
In this section we study the complexity of abduction-based update when the set of events
and the family of orderings are considered to be part of the input of the problem. We begin
with the case in which an enumerative representation of events and orderings is used. We
have the following result.
Theorem 28. If E and O are enumeratively represented, checking explainability and
inference are polynomial problems.
Proof. Consider for instance the problem of explainability using weak explanations.
A formula µ is explainable if there exists an event e such that e(I) ∩ Mod(µ) 6= ∅ for
some model I ∈ Mod(φ). This can be checked as follows: we consider each possible
event e. Since events are represented enumeratively, we can check in linear time if
there exists I such that e(J ) has the given property: indeed, checking I ∈ Mod(φ) and
e(I)∩Mod(µ) 6= ∅ only takes an amount of time that is linear in the size of I and e(I). 2
The proof of this theorem clearly shows that the enumerative representation of events
and orderings is not very meaningful. Indeed, the low complexity is due to the fact that,
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in order to represent E and O , we need to enumerate all models that are relevant to the
update.
It is easy to find examples in which such a representation is not suitable. Consider
Example 3: the testing action can be represented by an event test whose effect is to map
each model I into its singleton, i.e., test(I)= {I }. If we use the enumerative representation
of events, an exponential amount of space is needed to represent this simple event.
This problem can be overcome by making the assumption of polynomiality of the events
and the family of orderings. Consider a single event e. In many cases, it is reasonable to
assume that checking whether J ∈ e(I) is polynomial in the number of variables. This
assumption can be used as follows: from a well-known theorem of circuit complexity
[2], it follows that there exists a polynomial-size circuit having 2n input gates, and one
output whose value is 1 if and only if the input gates corresponds to two interpretations
I and J such that J ∈ e(I). As a result, we can represent events and orderings using the
corresponding circuits.
Let us begin with the problem of explainability.
Theorem 29. Checking explainability given E, O , φ, and µ is NP-complete (weak
explanations).
Proof. Membership follows from the fact that explainability can be done by guessing two
models I and J and an event e such that:
• I ∈Mod(φ);
• J ∈ e(I);
• J ∈Mod(µ).
Hardness is easy to prove. 2
The problem of inference using weak explanations is 5p2-complete.
Theorem 30. Checking φ ∗ABD µ  ψ given E, O , φ, µ, and ψ is 5p2-complete (weak
explanations).
Proof. Membership is proved as follows: φ ∗ABD µ 2 ψ can be reduced to a ∃∀QBF as
follows:
∃I∃e∃J.J ∈ e(I)∧ I ∈Mod(φ)∧ J ∈Mod(µ)∧ J /∈Mod(ψ)∧∧
s: s≺I e
∀L.L ∈ e(I)→ L /∈Mod(µ).
Note that, since there are only a polynomial number of events, the subformula
∧
s: s≺e . . .
is actually of polynomial size. As a result, non-inference can be reduced to a ∃∀QBF, thus
inference is in 5p2.
Hardness can be proved as in Theorem 24: indeed, the events and orderings used in
the proof of that theorem are polynomial in the size of the QBF that is to be reduced to
inference in update. As a result, the problem is 5p2-complete. 2
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Regarding predictive explanations, it is easy to prove that explainability is 6p2 -complete
and inference is 5p2-complete, if E and O are given as a part of the input.
9.3. Iterated update
Let us analyze the problem of iterated update. For simplicity, we consider only the case
in which E and O are part of the input. We begin with the definition based upon weak
explanations.
Theorem 31. Deciding whether (. . . (φ ∗ABD µ1) . . .) ∗ABD µm ψ is 5p2-complete (weak
explanations).
Proof. Hardness follows from the fact that the problem is 5p2-hard with m= 1.
In order to prove membership, we consider the cost of evaluating Jm  (. . . (φ ∗ABD
µ1) . . .) ∗ABD µm. We define a trajectory to be a sequence
[I, e1, J1, . . . , em,Jm]
where I, J1, . . . Jm are interpretations, while e1, . . . , em are events.
Jm is a model of the iteratively updated k.b. if and only if there exists a trajectory whose
last element is Jm itself, and such that:
(1) J1 ∈ e1(I), . . . , Jm ∈ em(Jm−1);
(2) I ∈Mod(φ), J1 ∈Mod(µ1), . . . , Jm ∈Mod(µm);
(3) There exists no event e′1 such that
(a) e′1(I)∩Mod(µ1) 6= ∅,
(b) e′1 ≺I e1;
(4) There exists no event e′i such that
(a) e′i (Ji−1) ∩Mod(µi) 6= ∅,
(b) e′i ≺Ji−1 ei .
Let us have a closer look at the quantifier involved in this definition. The first quantifier
is existential (exists a trajectory). Inside, we have two polynomial steps (Ji ∈ ei(Ji−1) and
Ji ∈Mod(µi)), and then the negation of two nested existential quantifiers (does not exists
e′i such that e′i (Ji−1)∩Mod(µi) 6= ∅, and the latter is equivalent to “exists K that is both in
e′i (Ji−1) and Mod(µi)”). This is an ∃¬∃ problem, thus it can be expressed as an ∃∀QBF.
Let us consider the problem of query answering. We have (. . . (φ ∗ABD µ1) . . .) ∗ABD
µm ψ if and only each model of the updated knowledge base is also a model of ψ . This
is true if and only if each model either is not a model of the updated base, or is a model of
ψ . As a result, we have to check whether there exists a model that does not satisfy an ∃∀
condition, thus the whole problem can be expressed as a ∀∃QBF formula. As a result, this
problem is in 5p2. 2
Considering predictive explanations, the complexity does not change.
Theorem 32. Deciding whether (. . . (φ ∗ABD µ1) . . .) ∗ABD µm  ψ is 5p2-complete
(predictive explanations).
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Proof. Let us rewrite the definition of abduction-based update with predictive explana-
tions. It holds that Jm  (. . . (φ ∗ABDµ1) . . .)∗ABDµm if and only if there exists a trajectory
[I, e1, J1, . . . , em,Jm], such that
(1) e1(I)  µ1, . . . , em(Jm−1)  µm.
(2) J1 ∈ e1(I), . . . , Jm ∈ em(Jm−1).
(3) e′1 ≺I e1 implies e′1(I) 2 µ1.
(4) e′i ≺Ji−1 ei implies e′i (Ji−1) 2 µi .
This can be expressed as a QBF. Each condition “e′i ≺Ji−1 ei implies e′1(Ji−1) 2 µi” is
indeed an ∃QBF, since it amounts to guessing a model of e′i (Ji−1) that is not a model of
µi , and this can be done concurrently for all possible events e′i (the point is that there are
only a polynomial number of events).
The whole condition can thus be expressed as a ∃∀QBF, since it is equivalent to “exists
a trajectory such that all the models of e1(I) are models of µ1, etc., and e′1 ≺I e1 implies
. . . ”.
Since the membership of a model to the updated k.b. is an ∃∀QBF, query answering can
be expressed as a ∀∃QBF, since it amounts to checking whether for each interpretation,
either it is not a model of the updated k.b., or it is a model of ψ . As a result, the problem
of iterated query answering is in 5p2. Hardness follows from the fact that the problem is
5
p
2-hard when m= 1. 2
10. Generalized update
The generalized update was introduced by Boutilier [4] to formalize scenarios where
an update may lead to revising the knowledge about the initial state, as in Example 3. Let
a ranking κ be a partial function from interpretations to non-negative integers, such that
there is at least one interpretation I such that κ(I) = 0. The meaning of this ranking is
that if κ(I) < κ(J ) then the interpretation I is believed to be more plausible than J . In
terms of possible worlds, each model represents a complete description of the state, and
κ(I) < κ(J ) means that the world described by I is more likely than the world described
by J . The interpretations ranked 0 are those considered most plausible. Since φ is believed,
the models of φ must be exactly those ranked 0. When κ(I) is not defined, the scenario
represented by I is considered impossible. In this case, we write κ(I)=∞.
We formalize the possible changes in the world as a set of possible events that may occur.
For each event, we have to specify the plausibility that the possible world represented
by a model I will be transformed into the world represented by another model J . This
plausibility is a function e from triples 〈event,model,model〉 to integers. It can be a
partial function, and e(e, I, J ) =∞ means that the transition from I to J is considered
impossible, when the event e happens.
A generalized update model is a 5-tuple 〈M, κ, e,E,m〉, whereM is as usual the set of
all interpretations, κ is a ranking, E is a set of events, e is as said above a function from
triples 〈event,model,model〉 to integers, and m is a function from pairs 〈event,model〉 to
integers, representing how likely an event is, in the world represented by a given model.
The new rank of the interpretations after the update is:
κ(J )=min({e(e, I, J )+m(e, I)+ κ(I) | I ∈M, e ∈E},6).
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The model J may be a possible world after the update only if there exists a model I and
an event e such that J is the outcome of the event e occurring in the world represented
by I . Now, I has its own plausibility, represented by the ranking κ(I). The occurrence of
event e has a plausibility too, represented by m(e, I), and there is also a plausibility of J
being the outcome of the event e happening in I . The sum of these plausibility degrees
represents the whole plausibility of all these facts. Since there are many possible worlds I
and events e, the plausibility of J is considered to be the minimal value, for all I and e.
This function κ(J ) induces an ordering in a natural way: I 6 J if and only if
κ(I)6 κ(J ). One way to define the update is




that is, the models of the result are the models of µ whose rank κ is minimal.
Example 10. Consider the formalization of Example 3 of the introduction. We use x1
to denote that compatible keyboards are in the warehouse. x2 denote that there are non-
compatible keyboards. The formulae expressing the knowledge base and the update are
φ5 = x1 6≡ x2, µ5 = x2.
This scenario can be formalized using the generalized update model 〈M, κ, e,E,m〉,
where M is the set of interpretations over the alphabet {x1, x2}, and there is only one
event: E = {test}, which is the event of testing the keyboards. The ranking κ is:
κ({x1})= κ({x2})= 0,
κ(∅)= κ({x1, x2})=∞,
since the models {x1} and {x2} are considered possible in the world before the test, while
the other models ∅ and {x1, x2} are considered impossible (the initial k.b. is x1 6≡ x2).
The event test is known to have happened, thus
m(test, I )= 0 for each I ∈M.
Finally, we specify how the event test maps interpretations into interpretations. We can
assume, since test does not modify the properties of the keyboards, that the result of the
test is exactly the situation before it.
e(test, I, I )= 0 for any I ∈M,
e(test, I, J )=∞ if I 6= J.
Using this generalized update model we can find the ranking κ:
κ({x2})= 0,
κ(J )=∞ for any J 6= {x2},
thus φ5 ∗GU µ5 =¬x1 ∧ x2.
The main advantage of the generalized update is that it gives some information about
the scenario before the update. In the example above, it allows to say that ¬x1 ∧ x2 was
true also before the test.
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We now show the complexity of the generalized update. This update turns out to be
simpler than the basic (Winslett’s) update.
We have to make some computational assumptions on the involved functions. Namely,
we still write φ ∗GU µ, and we implicitly assume that E is part of the input, but not M
(this is the set of all the interpretations over the given alphabet). Also, we assume that
the functions κ , e and m of the revision model can be calculated in polynomial time, and
are given as input. This means that given an event e and two models I and J , it must be
possible to determine the integer e(e, I, J ) in polynomial time. The same for κ and m.
Under these assumptions, the entailment problem for this update is 1p2-complete, while
consistency is NP-complete.
Theorem 33. Consistency of φ ∗GU µ is NP-complete.
Proof. Membership: the updated k.b. is consistent if and only if there exist I , J , and e
such that
(1) J ∈Mod(µ).
(2) κ(I)+ e(e, I, J )+m(e, I) 6=∞.
Hardness: µ is consistent if and only if true ∗GU µ is consistent, using the generalized
update model 〈M, κ, e,E,m〉, where κ(I) = 0 for each I , E = {e}, m(e, I) = 0 and
e(e, I, J )= 0, for each e, I , and J . 2
In order to determine the complexity of query answering of ∗GU , we need two
preliminary lemmas.
Lemma 8. If f is a function from interpretations to non-negative integers, such that the
number f (I) is always representable with a polynomial number of bits, and deciding
whether f (I)6 k is in NP, then determining the minimal value of f (I) for I ∈Mod(µ) is
in 1p2, for any formula µ.
Proof. First of all, since f (I) can be represented with nc bits, the maximal value it can
assume is 2nc . Consider that checking whether there exists an interpretation I ∈Mod(µ)
such that f (I)6 k is in NP, since it amounts to guessing an interpretation that satisfies an
NP property.
The minimum value of f (I) can be determined by binary search: start with k = 2nc/2,
and check whether there exists an interpretation I ∈Mod(µ) such that f (I)6 k. If this is
the case, assign 2nc/4 to k. Otherwise, assign 2nc3/4 to k. This binary search requires a
call to an NP oracle at each step. Since the number of steps required is log(2nc)= nc , this
algorithm runs in polynomial time using a polynomial number of calls to the oracle, thus it
is in 1p2. Furthermore, the last value of k such that there exists I ∈Mod(µ) with f (I)6 k
is the required minimum. 2
Lemma 9. If f is a function from interpretations to non-negative numbers, such that the
number f (I) is always representable with a polynomial number of bits, and deciding
whether f (I)6 k is in NP, then deciding whether
Form
({I | f (I) ∈min({f (I) | I ∈Mod(µ)},6)}) ψ
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is in 1p2.
Proof. By Lemma 8, the minimal value of f (I) can be found with a polynomial number
of calls to an NP oracle. In order to decide whether the statement Form(. . .)  ψ is true,
we need only one other call to the oracle. Indeed, guess a model I such that I ∈Mod(µ),
f (I) is minimal, and I 2ψ . If this is not possible, ψ is implied. 2
The above lemma allows to prove that the generalized update is in 1p2.
Theorem 34. Deciding whether φ ∗GU µ ψ is in 1p2.
Proof. The functions κ , e and m are polynomial by hypothesis, thus the sum κ(I) +
e(e, I, J )+m(e, I) can be represented with a polynomial number of bits. As a result, the
function κ can be represented with a polynomial number of bits as well. Furthermore,
the check κ(J ) 6 k is in NP, since it amounts to checking whether there exists an
interpretation I and an event e such that κ(I)+ e(e, I, J )+m(e, I)6 k.
Since φ ∗GU µ  ψ if and only if
Form
({J | κ(J ) ∈min({κ(J ) | J ∈Mod(µ)},6)}) ψ
then Lemma 9 applies, thus the problem is in 1p2. 2
As for the hardness of this update semantics, we note that one of the revision operators in
the literature, namely Dalal’s revision [7], can be polynomially reduced to the generalized
update.
Theorem 35. Let 〈M, κ, e, {e},m〉 be the revision model defined as:
M= set of all models,
k(I)=
{
0 if I ∈Mod(φ),
∞ otherwise,
e(e, I, J )= number of elements in Diff (I, J ),
m(e, I)= 0 for any I.
Using the above revision model, it holds φ ∗GU µ= φ ∗D µ for any pair of propositional
formulae, where ∗D is Dalal’s revision.
As a corollary, since the revision of Dalal is 1p2[logn]-complete [8], the complexity of
the generalized update is 1p2[logn]-hard. This result can be strengthened, as the following
theorem shows.
Theorem 36. Deciding whether φ ∗GU µ ψ is 1p2-complete.
Proof. In order to prove the 1p2-hardness of ∗GU , we reduce the problem of the
lexicographically minimal model to it. Consider an interpretation as a string of 0’s and 1’s.
This induces an ordering over the interpretations, where I < J if the value of the binary
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number represented by the string associated to I is less than that of J . The problem of
the lexicographically minimal model is to decide whether the minimal model of a formula,
with respect to this ordering, contains xn (that is, if the string associated with this model
ends with a 1). This problem is 1p2-complete [18].
We use the update model 〈M, κ, e, {e},m〉, where κ(I) is the number associated to I as
above, e(e, I, J )= 0 if and only if I = J (otherwise is equal to∞) and m(e, I)= 0. With
this update model, φ ∗GU true is a formula with only one model—the lexicographically
minimal model of φ. Thus, deciding whether the lexicographically minimal model of φ
“ends” with 1 amounts to verifying whether φ ∗GU true  xn. 2
The generalized update has a lower complexity than Winslett’s update. Thus (unless
the polynomial hierarchy collapses) it is impossible to reduce the latter to the former in
polynomial time.
Let us now consider the properties of iterated update. By definition, the generalized
update works on a generalized update model, that is, a tuple 〈M, κ, e,E,m〉. We can
assume that the ranking of events m does not change (this is the plausibility of an event
taking place in the world represented by a model). We can also assume that the way
in which events modify the world does not change, thus e remains the same. We have
now to define the new ranking of the interpretations, that is, the function κ . This ranking
must change, since it represents the plausibility of possible worlds. From κ we can derive
the current knowledge base: it is the formula corresponding to the set of interpretations
ranked 0.
As a first attempt, we may define the new ranking to be κ. However, the ranking κ is
not acceptable as a ranking of models, since there may be no models ranked 0. For example,
suppose that there are only two interpretations I and J , ranked 0 and∞, respectively, and
only one event e such that m(e, I) = 1, e(e, I, I ) = 1, and e(e, I, J )=∞. We have that
κ(I)= 1 and κ(J )=∞, thus there is no interpretation ranked 0 by κ.
In order to define the new ranking κ2, we must take into account the fact that κ2 must
obey the principle
φ ∗GU µ= Form
({J | κ2(J )= 0})
that is, the interpretations ranked 0 are exactly the models of the updated k.b.. κ cannot
be used as a ranking because
(1) The minimal value of κ(J ) for J ∈Mod(µ) may be greater than 0.
(2) There may be models of ¬µ that are ranked 0.
There are two standard ways to overcome these problems. The first one is called
conditionalization [25,26]. Let
κpos =min({κ(J ) | J ∈Mod(µ)},6),
κneg =min({κ(J ) | J /∈Mod(µ)},6).
The ranking κ2 is defined as
κ2(J )=
{
κ(J )− κpos if J ∈Mod(µ),
κ(J )− κneg + 1 if J /∈Mod(µ).
In other words: the first rule ensures that the minimal models of µ are ranked 0, since
the ranking of models of µ is decreased by the minimal value of them. The second rule
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ensures that the only interpretations ranked 0 are models of µ, since the models of ¬µ
are ranked at least 1. The models of µ are all translated down by κpos, thus the “bottom”
reaches the 0. The interpretations that are not models of µ are translated down by κneg− 1,
thus the “bottom” has ranking 1.
The second way of defining κ2 is called adjustment [3,25,26]. Let κpos be as above. The
new ranking is defined as
κ2(J )=
{0 if J ∈Mod(µ)∩ {I | κ(I)= κpos},
1 if J ∈Mod(¬µ)∩ {I | κ(I)= 0},
κ(J ) otherwise.
Roughly speaking: the minimal models of µ will be ranked 0. The models of ¬µ that
were ranked 0 are ranked 1. Any other model maintains the same ranking. This way, the
minimal models of µ are ranked 0, and no other interpretation has ranking 0.
Theorem 37. The iterated generalized update based on conditionalization has a query
answering in 1p2.
Proof. First of all, we need a consistent notation to represent models and ranking at any
specified time point. Let [µ1, . . . ,µm] be the sequence of updates, taking place at time
t1, . . . , tm (formally, this is a finite sequence of elements, that is, a set of m elements with
an associated total ordering). By definition,M, e, E and m remain the same trough time.
We use κi to denote the “preliminary ranking” obtained updating the model at time ti−1,
that is, it represents the first guess of ranking at time ti . The final ranking at time ti is
instead represented by κ2i . We use also κposi to denote the minimal value of κi for the
models of µi , and κnegi to denote the minimal value for the other interpretations. Fig. 2
illustrates this notation.
Since determining whether κ1 (J ) 6 k is in NP, from Lemma 8 it follows that
determining its minimum value for J ∈Mod(µ1) is in 1p2, that is, κpos1 can be determined
with a polynomial number of calls to an NP oracle. The same holds for κneg1 . Once κ
pos
1
and κneg1 are known, the problem of deciding whether κ
2
1 (J )6 k is in NP, since
κ21 (J )6 k iff
J  µ∧ ∃e, I . κ(I)6 k + κ
pos
1 − e(e, I, J )−m(e, I)
OR
J 2 µ∧ ∃e, I . κ(I)6 k + κneg1 − e(e, I, J )−m(e, I)− 1.
Fig. 2. Notation used for iterated generalized update.
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This proves that deciding whether κ21 (J ) 6 k is in NP. Moreover, the value assumed
by this function is never greater than the sum of the functions κ , e and m. As a result,
the function κ21 obeys the hypothesis of Lemma 8. Thus, we can repeat the above proof
replacing κ with κ21 , obtaining that κpos2 and κneg2 can be determined with a polynomial
number of calls to the oracle, and that deciding whether κ22 (I)6 k is in NP.
We have proved that κ2m(M)6 k can be decided with a polynomial number of calls to
the oracle. To be more precise, once the values of all κposi and κ
neg
i are determined (which is
in 1p2), the check κ2m(M)6 k is in NP. From Lemma 9 it follows that the query answering
problem is in 1p2. 2
The complexity of adjustment is the same. We omit the proof, since it is similar to that
of conditionalization.
Theorem 38. The iterated generalized update based on adjustment has a query answering
in 1p2.
Up to now, we have used the update only for deriving information about the state of the
world after the update. Formally, φ ∗GU µ  ψ holds if and only if ψ is true in the world
after the update. The problem of iterated query answering is a query about the state of the
world after a whole sequence of updates.
As shown in Example 3, an update may modify the knowledge about previous states.
We start with the case of a single update, as in Example 3.
Following Boutilier [4], we define a transition as a triple 〈I, e, J 〉 where e is an event
and I , J are interpretations. The ranking of a transition is
Rt(〈I, e, J 〉)= κ(I)+ e(e, I, J )+m(e, I).
Informally, a transition represents the fact that the event e has taken place in the world I ,
leading to the interpretation J . The µ-possible transitions are the transitions 〈I, e, J 〉 with
J ∈Mod(µ). The state of the world before the update is defined as
φ ∗0GU µ= Form({I | ∃e, J . 〈I, e, J 〉 is a minimal µ-transition with respect to Rt }).
The problem of interest is to establish which facts can be inferred about the previous
state, that is, whether φ ∗0GU µ  ψ . This problem is of interest because an update may
allow establishing the truth value of facts in the previous state. A typical case is when the
update is due to an action of testing: the result of the test not only allows determining some
facts about the current state, but also in the previous state. Some more complex scenarios
are possible [4].
Theorem 39. Deciding φ ∗0GUµ ψ (that is, deciding whetherψ is true in the state before
the update) is 1p2-complete.
Proof. Let f be:
f (I)=min({Rt(〈I, e, J 〉) | e ∈E,J ∈Mod(µ)},6).
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By definition, φ ∗0GU µ ψ if and only if
Form
({I | f (I) ∈min({f (I) | I ∈Mod(µ)},6)}) ψ.
Furthermore, f (I) is always representable with a polynomial number of bits (it is the
sum of κ , e, and m) and f (I) 6 k is in NP, since it amounts to checking whether there
are e and J such that κ(I)+ e(e, I, J )+m(e, I)6 k. From Lemma 9 it follows that the
problem of inference is in 1p2.
We prove that the problem is1p2-hard. As in Theorem 36, we use the number associated
with each interpretation. We define κ(I) to be the number associated to the interpretation
I . Moreover, there is only one event e, such that e(e, I, J ) is 0 if I = J , ∞ otherwise.
Finally, m(e, I)= 0 for any event e and interpretation I . It is easy to see that φ ∗0GU true
has exactly one model (if φ is consistent), that is the lexicographically minimal model of φ.
Deciding whether this model has xn or not amounts to checking whether φ ∗0GUµ  xn. 2
The previous theorem is about the complexity of deciding whether a piece of
information, regarding the state before a single update, can be inferred. However, the
problem of interest is more general: given a sequence of updates, the last update may
modify the state of the world in any of the previous time points. Boutilier [4] gives a
definition only for the case of a single change, but we can unleash our imagination and
give a definition for case of iterated update.
We define a trajectory as a sequence
[I, e1, J1, e2, . . . , em,Jm]
where I and Ji are interpretations and ei are events. Extending the notion of ranking for
transitions, we define the ranking of a trajectory to be
Rt ([I, e1, J1, e2, . . . , em,Jm])







One can see that this definition extends the definition of ranking for transitions, in the
sense that when m= 1 they coincide.
Suppose that we have a sequence of updates [µ1, . . . ,µm]. A possible trajectory for the
sequence is a trajectory [I, e1, . . . , em,J ] such that
J1 ∈Mod(µ1), . . . , Jm ∈Mod(µm).
We are interested in the minimal possible trajectories. Formally, the k.b. at time ti (the
time in which µi holds) is




∣∣∣∣∣ ∃I, e1, . . . , em,Jm such that [I, e1, . . . , ei, Ji , . . . , em,Jm]is a minimal possible trajectory with respect to Rt
})
.
The problem of inference can be easily proved to be 1p2-complete.
Theorem 40. Deciding whether φ ∗iGU [µ1, . . . ,µm] ψ is 1p2-complete.
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Proof. Consider the function f defined as
f (Ji)=min
({Rt([I, e1, . . . , Ji, . . . , em,Jm]) | I ∈M, Jj ∈Mod(µj ),
e1, . . . , em ∈E},6
)
.
Clearly, φ ∗iGU [µ1, . . . ,µm] ψ if and only if
Form
({Ji | f (Ji) ∈min({f (I) | I ∈Mod(µi)},6})}) ψ.
Since f can be represented with a polynomial number of bits and f (Ji) 6 k can be
decided in NP, we can apply Lemma 9, concluding that the considered problem is in 1p2.
Hardness follows from the fact that φ ∗1GU µ= φ ∗GU µ, and the latter has been already
proved to be 1p2-hard. 2
11. Discussion
In this paper we have investigated some of the semantics that have been introduced to
formalize changes in the world of interest. As summarized in Table 1, the complexity of
most of them turns out to be at the second level of the polynomial hierarchy. This is quite a
remarkable result: indeed, these frameworks have been proposed to overcome drawbacks
and limitations of the original semantics of update introduced by Winslett, but this does
not seem to introduce any increase in terms of computational complexity.
Let us discuss the presented results. As previously shown, many update operators can be





This is in some sense the “natural” form of update operators. Indeed, as shown by
Katsuno and Mendelzon [17], update differs from revision for the fact that each model of
Table 1
Complexity of belief update
Consistency Query answering Iterated
query answering
Standard semantics NP-complete co-NP-complete co-NP-complete
Winslett NP-complete 5p2-complete 5
p
2-complete
MCE NP-complete 5p2-complete 5
p
2-complete
MCD NP-complete 5p2-complete 5
p
2-complete
DEP NP-complete co-NP-complete co-NP-complete










Generalized update NP-complete 1p2-complete 1
p
2-complete
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the knowledge base to be modified must be updated separately, that is, for any I ∈Mod(φ)
we compute Form({I }) ∗ µ, and put together all models obtained this way. Now, the
minimal change principle implies that the models of Form({I })∗µ are the models of µ that
are the closest to I , according to some principle of closeness. The closed world assumption
principle can be reformulated as: “choose the models that have as many false variables as
possible”. In other words, the closest models to ∅ are chosen. As a result, by swapping the
value of literals in µ, we can reduce the problem of finding the models that are closest to
I to the problem of finding the models that are closest to ∅, which is actually what CWA
does. This argumentation shows that expressing updates in terms of CWA is not only a
technical trick, but it is really intuitively justified.
The complexity results can also be explained using this kind of translations. Indeed,
the problem φ ∗ µ  ψ amounts to checking whether for all interpretations J , either
J /∈Mod(φ ∗µ) or J ∈Mod(ψ). While the latter is polynomial, checking J ∈Mod(φ ∗µ)
is equivalent to “there exists I ∈Mod(φ) such that some relation between I and J holds”.
As a result, the complexity of update is affected by the complexity of establishing whether
such relation between I and J holds. For the standard semantics and the update with
dependence function, this is easy, as it amounts to comparing I and J over a subset of
the variables. As a result, these update operators are co-NP-complete. On the other hand,
for Winslett’s and Zhang and Foo’s update operators the relation is more complex to check,
as it amounts to verifying whether J is one of the closest models to I according to some
CWA semantics. Since CWA is usually more complex than simply checking equality, these
update operators are more complex than ∗SSU and ∗He.
Only one semantics turns out to have a different complexity than Winslett’s: Boutilier’s
generalized update, which is easier (1p2-complete). This difference can be explained in
terms of the similarity between the generalized update and Dalal’s revision. Indeed, both
are based on a concept of closeness between models of the knowledge base and models
of the update. In order to check whether φ ∗ µ  ψ , we can proceed by determining the
minimal distance between models of φ and models of µ, and then using this number
for making a final call to an NP oracle. The process of finding this minimal number is
what requires the logarithmic/polynomial number of calls to the oracle. The difference in
complexity between Dalal’s approach and the generalized update is due to the fact that
Dalal’s revision takes into account only the number of variables on which a model of the
knowledge base and a model of the update differ, while in the generalized update this can
be an arbitrary number (representable with a polynomial number of bits). This means that,
in order to determine the minimal distance for Dalal’s revision, a logarithmic number of
calls to the oracle suffices, while the minimal ranking for the generalized update can only
be determined with a polynomial number of calls to the oracle. As a result, one operator is
in 1p2[logn], while the other one is in 1p2.
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